Legislative commitment in Congress by Paschall, Collin E
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2018 Collin E. Paschall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE COMMITMENT IN CONGRESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
COLLIN E. PASCHALL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Professor Tracy Sulkin, Chair 
Professor James Kuklinski 
 Professor Jeffery Mondak 
 Associate Professor Gisela Sin 
ii 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates why some members of Congress (MCs) commit themselves 
to lawmaking in the pursuit of changing public policy – in other words, why some MCs behave 
as policy wonks. While the Framers envisioned that Congress would be the policymaking engine 
of the federal government and that some MCs would become master legislators, today Congress 
is routinely criticized for dysfunction and gridlock. In this context, the behavior of policy wonks 
is of normative and practical interest, but there remains relatively little research that focuses 
squarely on these members. I conceptualize policy wonks as MCs who commit to legislating by 
adopting intense, specialized, and consistent legislative agendas, and I identify policy wonks 
with a novel measure of legislative commitment based on these three components and using 
MCs’ slates of bill sponsorships from 1989 through 2008. Building on previous work on 
legislative entrepreneurship, I argue that MCs commit to legislating and act as policy wonks 
based on a strategic calculation that weighs the benefits that flow from this behavior against its 
costs. I find that legislative commitment is associated with MCs’ institutional positions, the 
characteristics of their districts, and future career advancement and legislative success. The 
implications of the research are mixed. While some MCs conform with the Framers’ 
expectations that they be committed legislators, not all the incentives in Congress are aligned to 
support MCs acting as policy wonks. 
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CHAPTER 1: “Masters of the Public Business” and Today’s Congress 
 
Studying Congress in the first quarter of the 21st century is not for the faint of heart. In 
recent years, the institution has come under severe criticism for policymaking gridlock and 
partisan combativeness, while public trust in government lingers at historic lows (Binder 2015; 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Howell and Moe 2016; Mann and Ornstein 2016). Following 
shifts in national demographics, the advent of heightened political polarization, consistently 
close and high-stakes national elections, and changes in its internal norms of operation (Carson 
et al. 2007; Levendusky 2008; Lee 2016; Theriault 2008), perceptions of Congress among the 
public and the scholarly community have turned decidedly negative. 
This dim view of Congress and its members is concerning not only to the extent that it 
underscores the political system’s lack of capacity to resolve problems, but also because it 
suggests that the legislative branch is operating in a way that is substantially different from 
what the Framers intended. In Federalist No. 51, the Framers wrote, “In a republican form of 
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.” The Constitution begins in 
Article I with the design of the legislative branch, an indication that the Framers meant for 
Congress to be the policymaking engine of the United States government. Between the growth 
of executive power and the incapacity of Congress, it is questionable whether this principle 
holds today.  
Along with envisioning Congress as the lawmaking branch, the Federalists also 
expected that the legislature would be home to at least some members that focused on this task. 
The Framers were aware of the challenge of governance. As they wrote in Federalist No. 53, in 
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“the great theater of the United States,” Congress would be tasked with solving complex 
problems, and representatives would require “extensive information” about many subjects 
(Fowler 1993).  To satisfy Congress’s institutional purpose, some members would have to be 
“thoroughly masters of the public business” (Federalist No. 53; see also Fowler 1993). Today, 
we might say that Hamilton and Madison recognized the need for “policy wonks” in the 
chamber – members who commit themselves to lawmaking in order to change public policy. 
Madison and Hamilton were not just constitutional theorists, however. They were also 
keen observers of legislative behavior. Along with anticipating that some members of 
Congress (MCs) would have to become masters of the public business, the Framers also 
articulated a theory about why representatives would adopt this strategy. They argued that “as 
it happens in all such assemblies,” MCs would be tempted by the opportunities for personal 
advancement and achievement that come with serving in a powerful political institution 
(Federalist No. 53). Hamilton and Madison expected that members would “avail themselves to 
those advantages,” developing “superior talents” as legislators as a means to pursue other goals 
(Federalist No. 53). Thus, while members of Congress might face substantial challenges while 
governing, the Framers believed that this incentive structure would drive members towards this 
desirable form of behavior (Fowler 1993). In expectation of rewards they desire,  MCs would 
find committing to lawmaking to be a good investment of their time and effort. 
How have the Framers’ expectations about the lawmaking habits of MCs played out? 
Experience and observation suggest that Madison and Hamilton’s theory of legislative 
behavior was correct, at least to a degree. Reviewing journalistic and biographical profiles of 
MCs, it is easy to find examples of representatives who stand out for the way they take on the 
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lawmaking aspect of their jobs. Lane Evans (D-IL), for example, rose to prominence for his work 
on veterans issues, spearheading efforts to get compensation for veterans exposed to Agent 
Orange and securing funding for veterans assistance programs (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 
2001). His colleague Ray LaHood (R-IL) hailed Evans as “voice for veterans” (Geiger and Sobol 
2014). Jim McCrery (R-LA) built his reputation as an ally of Bill Thomas (R-CA), who was his 
chair on the Ways and Means Committee (Barone and Cohen 2007). McCrery “worked hard on 
mastering the intricacies of tax, trade, and health care finance legislation,” and he tried to make 
Ways and Means a productive policymaking committee (Barone and Cohen 2007, 726-727). For 
these efforts, McCrery was known in Washington, D.C. as “the rare combination of studied 
policy wonk and keen political operator” (McGrane 2008). Other members are similarly notable 
for how they embark on crusades, zero-in, or become active and enthusiastic advocates on select 
issues. Such members are not always successful in their efforts. Pete Stark (D-CA), for instance, 
chaired a health subcommittee for ten years but never fully achieved his goal of increasing 
government's role in health care (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001). Nonetheless, Stark pressed 
forward, pursuing his legislative agenda so that the idea would live to be implemented another 
day. 
What distinguishes MCs like Evans, McCrery, and Stark is the way that they were 
committed to the legislative process. Having found issues that spoke to them personally, that 
aligned with demands from their constituencies, or were instrumentally useful in their quests for 
power and influence, these members focused on those topics and spent resources and energy to 
work on them across time. Hamilton and Madison would have called such MCs masters of the 
public business. Today, we would identify them as policy wonks. 
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Yet even while these descriptions point out that some members of Congress are 
outstanding as legislators, others are less distinguished. There are many members who come to 
Congress and get little done or are only there for a short time. Other members may have long 
tenures but leave no lasting policy achievements. Along these lines, consider Michael Doyle (D-
PA). Doyle was elected in 1994 and, as of 2018, is the dean of the Pennsylvania congressional 
delegation. During his career, he has generally tended to district interests and has been an avid 
earmarker. It is said of Doyle that he “rarely seeks attention or causes much of a ruckus” (Barone 
et al. 2013). Jack Kingston (R-GA) presents a contrast with Doyle in style, but he is similar in 
that his focus was not on policymaking. Elected in 1992, Kingston was defeated in the 2014 
primary for the Senate seat previously held by Saxby Chambliss. During his career in the House, 
Kingston was best known for being a partisan messenger in the media; he was the first lawmaker 
to appear on Stephen Colbert’s popular “Better Know a District” segment (Barone et al. 2013). 
In more than 20 years in Congress, Kingston introduced only four substantive and significant 
bills (Volden and Wiseman 2014).1 Finally, take as an example Todd Platts (R-PA). A moderate 
Republican, Platts hardly campaigned, and he was not an active fundraiser (Allen 2011). He was 
known for the unusual practice of driving 100 miles almost every day from Washington to his 
district in Pennsylvania (Barone and Cohen 2007). Once named the “chairman” of the “Obscure 
                                                     
1 Volden and Wiseman (2014) characterize a piece of legislation as substantive and significant if 
it was the subject of an end of year summary in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. A 
substantive bill is any piece of legislation that is not a commemorative bill, such as those 
renaming post offices or offering private relief to individuals. 
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Caucus” by the publication Roll Call, Platts defended his record, saying he’d “rather be a 
workhorse than a showhorse” (Allen 2011). In fairness, Platts did make contributions to 
Congress’s oversight work (Barone and Cohen 2007). However, his defense rings hollow with 
respect to his legislative accomplishments. Platts only saw two of his substantive bills signed 
into law during 12 years in his seat (Volden and Wiseman 2014). 
The contrast between MCs like Evans, McCrery, and Stark on one hand and Doyle, 
Kingston, and Platts on the other is the kind of puzzle that piques the curiosity of scholars of the 
American Congress. Because of its relevance to Hamilton and Madison’s constitutional design, it 
would be interesting to know the factors that are associated with MCs being active, specialized, 
and consistent legislators, operating as masters of the public business and policy wonks. Yet in 
today’s political climate the question takes on even greater urgency. When public faith in 
government is at a historical nadir and the list of public problems awaiting resolution is large, 
understanding the factors that are associated with MCs dedicating themselves to lawmaking 
speaks to fundamental questions about the American political system. If the origins and behavior 
of policy wonks can be explained, then citizens might have more faith that the American political 
system will either respond to the challenges it currently faces or that institutional reforms can 
help revitalize Congress’s problem-solving capacity. If this variation remains a mystery, then 
citizens will continue to operate in confusion and institutional reformers will continue to lack an 
important data point as they consider options for reinvigorating congressional capacity. This 
dissertation is designed to help avoid that outcome by providing an account of policy wonks in 
Congress. 
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Connecting Policy Wonks with Previous Research on Legislative Behavior 
Given their normative importance, particularly in light of the politics of recent years, it 
might come as a surprise that legislative scholars have not made policy wonks the subject of 
much theorizing or empirical study. Indeed, a review of literature on legislative behavior returns 
little work that engages directly with this concept. There are at least two reasons for this 
oversight. First, from the 1960s to early 1980s, when the field of congressional studies was 
taking shape, legislative capacity was arguably not as much of a normative concern as it is today. 
As the federal government expanded in scope and power in the post-World War II era, Congress 
demonstrated an ability to pass landmark legislation like that implementing Johnson’s Great 
Society initiatives, Nixon’s regulatory programs, and Reagan’s tax reforms (Mayhew 2005). In 
short, the issue of whether Congress was supporting the activities of policy wonks was not as 
pressing an issue as it became in later decades, when there have been greater doubts about 
federal policymaking capacity. 
The other reason for the relative neglect of Hamilton and Madison’s masters of the public 
business has to do with the course of development of the field of American legislative behavior. 
Two streams of scholarship were critical in this process. The first was the advent of the rational 
choice revolution in the 1970s. David Mayhew’s (1974) work on the electoral connection – 
which posited that MCs are primarily motivated by their interest in reelection – had a profound 
impact on how scholars thought about legislative behavior. With a simple model in which 
representatives make decisions by optimizing their behavior around a single goal, scholars were 
able to make rapid advances. Scholars realized that Mayhew’s concepts of position-taking, 
credit-claiming, and advertising could characterize a huge array of representational activities, 
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and they leveraged this insight to explain many kinds of legislative behavior, from voting in roll 
calls to providing constituency service to engaging in distributive politics (Arnold 1990; Bafumi 
and Herron 2010; Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Grimmer 
2013; Harden 2016; Kuklinski 1978; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). 
The second line of scholarship that has shaped much of the research on legislative 
behavior is that on the congruence between MCs’ actions and the ideological and policy 
preferences of citizens. Building off the classic research design of Miller and Stokes (1963), 
many studies have assessed whether MCs are responsive to the preferences of their constituents, 
often with an emphasis on whether constituents reward or punish lawmakers for voting in line 
with citizens’ preferences at the roll call stage (see, e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Canes-Wrone 
2002; Nyhan et al. 2012). While perhaps an oversimplification of the notion of legislative 
responsiveness (see, e.g., Mansbridge 2003), examining MC-district congruence in roll calls 
makes for a straightforward way to assess the nature of the principal-agent relationship between 
citizens and representatives.2 
The behavior of policy wonks does not fit squarely within a Mayhew-ian and Miller and 
Stokes-ian framework. Whether a MC is committed to lawmaking – in order words, acting as a 
master of the public business or a policy wonk – is not easily assessed by looking at a record of 
roll call votes, which cannot capture the intensity of MCs’ interests (Hall 1996). Additionally, to 
                                                     
2 Voting behavior in legislatures also has major implications for legislative productivity and the 
content of the policy agenda (see, e.g., Krehbiel 1998; Cox and McCubbins 2005). 
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the extent that policy wonks are intrinsically interested in making good public policy or work on 
making policy to advance their careers, this legislative strategy does not directly map on to the 
electoral connection (see Fenno 1973). As such, the behavior of policy wonks falls into an 
empirical and conceptual gap in the dominant theoretical approaches that Congress scholars have 
been using since the 1970s. It thus comes as little surprise that this pattern of legislative behavior 
has not been the subject of much research. 
Policy Wonks as a Type of Legislative Entrepreneur 
Although it is accurate to say that the majority of work on MCs’ legislative behavior has 
been focused on the electoral connection and MC-district congruence, there is a line of research 
that serves as the foundation for studying policy wonks. This comes from the work on legislative 
entrepreneurship, which springs largely from John Kingdon’s (1984) influential examination of 
the policymaking process. Kingdon imagined the policymaking process in Congress as being tied 
to the role of “policy entrepreneurs” who would assemble legislative packages and wait for 
“policy windows” during which they could pair their proposals with problems that arose in the 
course of public life. Kingdon characterized these entrepreneurs as policy “investors” – actors 
who were willing to spend current time, energy, and resources in expectation of future benefits.  
In general, the field of legislative studies has spent less time focused on entrepreneurship 
than it has testing the electoral connection and assessing roll call responsiveness. However, the 
last 25 years have begun to see a shift towards this way of thinking about MCs, with scholars 
paying increasing attention to how MCs act as legislators prior to the roll call stage. Scholars 
working in this area have completed a variety of useful studies examining how MCs introduce 
legislation, build coalitions, work with interest groups, participate in committee markup, and 
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even strategically select the issues on which they campaign. (Hall 1996; Kingston 1984; Schiller 
1995; Sulkin 2005; Sulkin 2011; Wawro 2001).  
How members participate at these stages of the lawmaking process is very important. 
Collectively, MCs’ activities set Congress’s legislative agenda and determine the choices that are 
presented to MCs (Hall 1996). Focusing on MCs’ entrepreneurial behaviors, and specifically the 
composition of their individual agendas, can be a powerful tool for studying legislative behavior 
and representation (see Sulkin 2005). By assessing activities that occur prior to the roll call stage 
but are more public than the backroom deliberations of MCs, an agenda-based approach provides 
scholars with a useful way of capturing the legislative priorities of MCs, how they respond to 
their constituents, and the way they address policy problems in the normal process of legislating. 
My contribution to this literature is to borrow concepts from entrepreneurship scholarship 
and apply them in a study that places its conceptual and empirical focus squarely on masters of 
the public business – a term that I use synonymously with policy wonk. I characterize these 
members of Congress as investors who take actions now in anticipation of benefits in the future. 
In my framework, MCs approach the Madisonian ideal when they commit to the legislative 
process by becoming increasingly (1) intense, (2) specialized, and (3) consistent in their 
legislative activities. This means that members work on more legislation, they focus these efforts 
across a limited number of substantive areas, and they persist in working in those same areas 
from Congress to Congress.  
I describe the reasons for these indicators in more detail in the next chapter, but in short, 
focusing on MCs’ intensity, specialization, and consistency makes logical sense given how 
Congress makes policy, and this pattern of behavior also reflects the practices of actual members 
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who have reputations as policy wonks. When members advance agendas with these attributes, it 
is a sign that they are focused on an issue, are willing to expend their resources to see their ideas 
become law, and are a potential source of information and solutions in a policy domain. Thus, 
using the components of intensity, specialization, and consistency to measure legislative 
commitment can identify which MCs are doing the kind of legislative work that the Framers 
intended.  
Motivations for Policy Wonks 
Along with presenting a conceptualization and measurement strategy for assessing policy 
wonks in Congress, my work also helps us to understand why members make the choice to 
commit to legislating. Drawing from and synthesizing the large body of previous research on 
legislative behavior, my explanation has two complementary components. First, the degree to 
which members commit to lawmaking is in part a function of how members pursue common 
objectives. Second, however, the contours of that pursuit are contingent on individual 
characteristics and political context.  
In theorizing about legislative commitment, I start from the goal-oriented framework 
introduced in the 1970s with work by scholars like Mayhew (1974), Fenno (1973), and Fiorina 
(1974) and later advanced by a vast amount of research on legislative politics. This work posits 
that members are informal utility optimizers, meaning that MCs pursue a set of commonly held 
goals by making strategic, rational choices about how to utilize their time, energy, relationships, 
and other forms of political capital. Most typically, it is assumed in this research that members 
work to achieve electoral, career, and policy objectives, although each member may place 
different weights on these objectives.  
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In this formulation, how members invest in lawmaking is a function of members 
pursuing these common goals, “availing” themselves of the advantages of this behavior to 
work towards their other objectives. The decision for an MC to be one of Hamilton and 
Madison’s masters of the public business is thus reducible to a cost-benefit calculation. Members 
will commit to legislating when they perceive that the benefits that flow from that activity 
outweigh the costs. 
While it is probable that members are motivated to pursue lawmaking as a function of 
their perception of the expected tradeoffs, this statement is perhaps too simple to capture how 
MCs make their decisions. As Hall wrote in his study of patterns of participation in Congress, 
while rational choice theory is a powerful tool for generating predictions about legislative 
behavior, “the concept of utility must be imbued with some substantive meaning” (Hall 1996, 
66). Indeed, each MC arrives in Congress with different prior experiences and personal 
orientations. Furthermore, each MC operates in at least two political contexts simultaneously, 
one in Washington and one in his or her home district. The features of these contexts can 
change over time. Thus, while members may share a set of common goals and all engage in a 
sort of economic optimization, the shape of the utility function and the weighting of the factors 
in it will be different from member to member. This is a way of saying that variation in MCs’ 
political contexts and personal characteristics is likely to be associated with variation in how 
they behave. In the parlance of research design, we might say loosely that members’ pursuit of 
common objectives has a heterogeneous effect on the extent to which they devote their energy 
towards policymaking. Intervening in their decisions is a set of individual and contextual 
factors that shape tradeoffs.  
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In the chapters to come, I describe a series of expectations for how political context and 
individual characteristics might shape MCs’ calculations about the utility of committing to the 
lawmaking process, and I provide empirical evidence of such relationships. However, to give a 
sense for this, it is useful to provide an illustration. First, consider the career of Henry 
Waxman, who is in many ways the paradigmatic model of a master of the public business.  A 
product of the 1974 post-Watergate Democratic wave, Waxman would go on to be one of the 
most distinguished policymakers of his era. A former member of the California Assembly, 
Waxman decided to focus on issues related to public health when he entered Congress, which he 
felt was a good match for the needs of his constituents and his previous legislative work 
(Waxman and Green 2009, 27). Skillful intra-party maneuvering earned Waxman the chair of the 
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment just five years into his 
tenure (Waxman and Green 2009, 32-35). From that position, Waxman went on to become one 
of the most accomplished legislators in Congress. His achievements included major policy 
successes in public health, ranging from funding pharmaceutical research for rare diseases to 
providing care for AIDS patients (Rogers 2014). When Waxman retired in 2015, he was 
remembered as one of the most influential and respected members of Congress (Ornstein 2014).  
Next, consider the career of Howard Coble (R-NC). At first glance, Coble shared little in 
common with Waxman. Coble was, quite literally, a colorful representative, known for his 
trademark brightly-colored, patterned suit jackets. Speaking with a slight southern drawl, he 
liked to eat brains and eggs, smoke cheap cigars, and flaunt his knowledge of the high school 
mascots in his district (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001, 1151; Times-News Editorial Board 
2015).  Like Henry Waxman, Coble earned quite a reputation as a policymaker, although his 
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legislative focus was perhaps unexpected given his personal history. A former garbage man with 
the Coast Guard, insurance salesman, and lawyer, Coble was self-admittedly computer illiterate 
(Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001, 1151). However, this did not stop him from enacting more 
than a dozen bills on copyright law and putting himself at the center of the digital revolution in 
intellectual property (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001, 1151; Times-News Editorial Board 
2015). While this topic might have been outside his own sphere of interest and experience, it 
does make sense given that Coble’s district included areas in North Carolina’s Research 
Triangle. Coble faced one razor-thin margin in his reelection to a second term, but beyond that 
he enjoyed essentially complete electoral security from 1985 to 2015, when he was forced to 
retire because of health concerns.  
Examining the backgrounds of Waxman and Coble suggests some factors that likely 
enabled their investment in lawmaking. For example, both had long tenures in the House, college 
educations, and electoral security. However, the members are not identical. Coble was a 
southern, conservative Republican, while Waxman was a liberal Democrat from California. 
Accordingly, Waxman began his career during the long period of Democratic dominance in the 
House, while Coble was not in the majority until much later in his career. In addition, Waxman 
was a prolific fundraiser, far more than Coble (Heberlig and Larson 2012). While Waxman and 
Coble were both former state legislators, the connection between Waxman’s agenda in the state 
legislature and his congressional agenda is clear but Coble’s is not. Additionally, by his own 
account, Waxman’s work in Congress was directly related to his personal belief in the power of 
government to address the problems of everyday people, imparted to him by his family 
(Waxman and Green 2009, 2). Coble’s perspective was quite different. Despite his notable work, 
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Coble was less sanguine about lawmaking, once describing his role in Congress as “one of 
keeping bad legislation off the books” (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001, 1151). 
Offering an account of legislative commitment that reconciles Coble and Waxman’s 
patterns of behavior is the ultimate objective of this dissertation. Perhaps it was their electoral 
security, or their personal backgrounds, or the course of their careers in Congress that led Coble 
and Waxman to invest as they did. However, making such a claim requires much more than a 
review of a few biographies. Instead, along with telling stories of individual members, I will 
present a theoretical framework that helps to explain why these members invested in lawmaking 
and a research design strategy that captures members’ legislative commitment systematically.  
Plan of the Dissertation 
In this project, I explain why some MCs are policy wonks and others are not. Chapter 2 
provides additional conceptual background, illustrating in more detail what I mean by this term 
and how understanding this behavior can help scholars to understand how Congress operates as 
a legislative, policymaking institution. I then outline my theory that explains patterns in 
legislative commitment. In short, I argue that each member of Congress shares, to varying 
degrees, a common motivation to work on policy issues. Members might expect that 
committing to legislating can help them to satisfy their electoral, professional, and policy-
related goals. However, the effect of that motivation is contingent on a set of personal and 
contextual factors that can modify the benefits and costs of legislative commitment as a 
behavioral strategy. As a result, I expect to see substantial variation in legislative commitment 
across members and across time. 
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In Chapter 3, I set out the basic research design that I use to study policy wonks. I draw 
on data on MCs’ bill introductions from the 101st to the 110th Congresses (1989-2008) 
(Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). This is a time period of unique interest in congressional studies, 
as it includes the Republican takeover of Congress and the rise of persistent partisan 
polarization. To the extent that pathologies of American political institutions are undermining 
faith in government today, the 1990s and early 2000s set the stage. Building on previous 
scholarship on legislative behavior as well as taking some inspiration from mathematical 
ecology, I introduce measures that capture MCs' legislative intensity, specialization, and 
consistency. Then, I illustrate how a composite of these measures – which I call a “legislative 
commitment score” – can serve as a useful way to capture how MCs devote their political 
resources to lawmaking. 
 Chapter 4 begins my investigation of the reasons for variation in legislative commitment. 
With my measure in hand, I test for a series of relationships between MCs acting as policy 
wonks, features of the political contexts in which MCs operate, and individual members’ 
personal characteristics. The results help provide an inventory of the factors that shape patterns 
of legislative commitment in Congress. 
 Chapter 5 explores whether members see a return on investing in lawmaking. I test to 
determine whether a member’s commitment to legislating results in a subsequent dividend in 
terms of electoral, professional, or policy outcomes. Comparing the results here with those from 
Chapter 4 provides a sense of whether MCs commit to legislating strategically or whether the 
impulse to do so is orthogonal to the traditional story of how members pursue their objectives. 
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 I close in Chapter 6 by summarizing my results and considering the implications of my 
findings. I discuss the opportunities for research that builds on my work, and I offer some 
comments on studying Congress and policy wonks in the current political environment in the 
United States. 
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CHAPTER 2: What do Policy Wonks Do, and Why Do They Do It? 
 
 In his book Congress at the Grassroots, Richard Fenno described the careers of two 
members of Congress from Georgia, Jack Flynt and Mac Collins. Flynt was a conservative 
Democratic representative from the central part of the state, southwest of Atlanta. First elected in 
1954, Flynt retired in 1978 after several close races with Newt Gingrich, who eventually took 
over his seat. Collins was a Republican representative elected in 1993 and serving until 2005, 
and he represented much of the same geography as Flynt had several decades earlier. Fenno’s 
book was a close-up, qualitative comparison of these two members and their approaches to 
representation. The key conceptual distinction that Fenno drew in his analysis was between the 
“person-intensive” style adopted by Flynt and “the policy-intensive” style of Collins. Flynt’s 
mode of representation was “grounded in his knowledge about and interest in individual 
constituents” (Fenno 2000, 148). Collins, on the other hand, “sought political involvement that 
centered on matters of public policy, especially…the strong conservative preferences he shared 
with a solid majority of his constituents” (Fenno 2000, 148). As Fenno described it, Collins was 
a “policy wonk” (Fenno 2000, 105). 
 The contrast between Flynt and Collins relates directly to the puzzle I presented in the 
first chapter. Flynt did not do a “bad” job of representing his district. He shared the policy 
preferences of many of his constituents, voted accordingly in Congress, and engendered a sense 
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of connection between his constituents and their government in Washington, D.C.3 Collins, 
however, seems closer to the Framers’ idea of a master of the public business. Whereas Flynt 
“never spoke of a bill, an amendment, or an initiative he was especially proud of” (31), Collins 
wanted to be a policy player and the “governing part” was the “part of the job he like[d]” (Fenno 
2000, 105). Madison and Hamilton would have recognized this distinction. Collins took 
advantage of the opportunity to legislate in a way that Flynt did not. 
Given the concerns today about congressional policymaking capacity, it is curious that 
the contrast that Fenno pointed out between these two members has not received more attention 
in congressional research. If part of the problem with Congress is that it cannot make policy, 
understanding the behaviors of policy-centric members seems an important avenue for research, 
for both its practical consequences and its implications for the balance of power in the 
constitutional system. As I speculated in the last chapter, the reason for this gap in the literature 
might be explained with a review of the course of the development of the literature on legislative 
behavior. One possibility is that a focus on the reelection incentive and roll call voting may have 
crowded out studying the kinds of legislative behaviors that distinguish between MCs like Flynt 
and Collins (but see Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). It is also possible that Fenno’s book did not 
clearly set the table for follow-up scholarship. Although his observational study is fascinating in 
its detail and theoretically rich, in Congress at the Grassroots, Fenno did not include an 
extensive discussion that tied his research into the broader scholarship on legislative behavior. 
                                                     
3 It should be noted that this included Flynt sharing many of his constituents’ preferences for 
racist, segregationist policies. 
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Additionally, Fenno acknowledged that he was only telling two stories of district-level 
representation, and so the book was not intended to be a comprehensive take on the origins and 
consequences of the policy- and person-centric strategies in Congress. 
Congress at the Grassroots, then, presents opportunities for scholarship that speaks to 
current concerns about Congress. However, pursuing this line of inquiry requires conceptual, 
theoretical, and empirical advances. In this chapter, I aim at the first two of these. Revisiting 
previous research on legislative behavior, I place the under-explored behavior of the policy wonk 
in the framework that previous scholarship has constructed for understanding how MCs behave 
as representatives. Further, I draw on work on MCs’ strategic behavior to explain why an MC 
would choose to become a master of the public business, or not.  
MCs Behavioral Options in Congress and The Place for Wonks 
 Perhaps the most underappreciated point about the organization of Congress and the 
behavior of members is that there is no job description or any minimum performance criteria for 
MCs. No matter how serious the concerns of citizens or scholars about congressional 
policymaking capacity, there is no constitutional requirement than any individual MC do 
anything about it. As members of a “free profession” operating in an institution without the kinds 
of rigid hierarchical structures that typically characterize private firms or executive 
bureaucracies, members of Congress have substantial latitude about how to approach their jobs 
(Hall 1996). Members can leverage their and their staff’s time, energy, and attention as they see 
fit, so long as they build a record that passes muster among their constituents. 
With such flexibility, the ways that MCs choose to behave with respect to the legislative 
process are highly varied, and policymaking is not always at the center of MCs’ representational 
20 
 
profile. As Fenno (2000) described, some members are clearly person-centric, focusing on 
responding to the needs of constituents and developing personal relationships with them. 
Members have a variety of tools they can leverage towards this end. These include constituency 
service, such as helping constituents get services from the federal bureaucracy, and distributive 
politics, like directing federal spending to the district (Bishin 2009; Box-Steffensmeier et al 
2003; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Grimmer 2013). Indeed, allocational and service 
responsiveness are both important theoretical aspects of the representational relationship, so it is 
little surprise that many members engage in such activities (Eulau and Karps 1977; Harden 
2016). 
 In addition to taking actions targeting their constituents and their districts, MCs also 
expend energy advancing partisan objectives and their own career goals. Members spend a great 
deal of time on such activities, perhaps most prominently fundraising and campaigning on behalf 
of copartisans (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Currinder 2009; Sinclair 2006). Members 
contribute campaign funds to other members to garner support in their efforts to gain leadership 
positions (Cann 2008; Heberlig and Larson 2012). Members also spend substantial energy 
supporting their parties beyond fundraising, for example by joining and working in intra-party 
organizations (Rubin 2017). Finally, members commonly pursue activities related to seeking 
higher office beyond Congress (Herrick and Moore 1993; Hibbing 1986; Schlesinger 1966; 
Victor 2010).  
 Highlighting the constituency service, partisan work, and career ambitions of MCs proves 
the underlying point: many MCs can have meaningful congressional careers that focus on 
objectives other than lawmaking. Indeed, looking at a large set of behavioral indicators, 
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Bernhard and Sulkin (2018) showed this empirically, using cluster analysis to group MCs into 
five distinct legislative styles: party soldiers, policy specialists, ambitious entrepreneurs, district 
advocates, and party builders. Grimmer (2013) made a similar point with his research analyzing 
communications of MCs, separating members into groups based on whether they emphasized 
pork or policy in their messages to constituents. In short, members have electoral goals and 
professional objectives outside of crafting public policy, and they could realistically satisfy these 
without substantial expenditure of resources in the legislative process. 
Policy Related Behaviors 
Even though they do not have to focus on legislating, it is important not to oversell the 
case about MCs’ ability to avoid policymaking as part of their jobs. All MCs work on policy in 
at least a limited sense while they hold a seat in the chamber. At the most basic level, a 
member’s decision about how to vote in roll calls is a way that MCs pursue their goal of making 
good public policy, and it is one that has been intensely studied.  The most frequently asked 
question about MCs’ roll call votes is how strong the relationship is between them and the 
preferences of an MC’s constituency – essentially a variation of the classic research design of 
Miller and Stokes (1963). On this point, the results are not entirely consistent, with some work 
finding a stronger relationship between the preferences of constituents than others (Ansolabehere 
et al. 2001; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Clinton 2006; 
Fiorina 1974). However, there is no question that MCs use roll call votes to satisfy many of their 
objectives. MCs can use roll call votes to take positions, credit claim, and signal to constituents 
that they are being their voice in the policymaking process in Washington (Mayhew 1974). Roll 
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call votes are also a way that MCs can communicate with interest groups, the Executive Branch, 
and their own party (Kingdon 1989). 
 As powerful and analytically useful as they are, though, roll call votes are only one way 
that MCs engage in the legislative process. Members do not limit their advocacy to voting when 
the leadership arranges it. Instead, MCs engage in a wide array of other policy-related behaviors 
in the day-to-day life of Congress. Very broadly, these pre-roll call legislative behaviors have 
been grouped by congressional scholars under the umbrella of “entrepreneurial behavior.” The 
use of the term entrepreneur with respect to legislative policymaking has roots going back to the 
1960s and 1970s, but the scholar most closely associated with popularizing the term in 
congressional studies is likely John Kingdon (1984). Entrepreneurship, as Kingdon meant it, is 
advocating for policy proposals and the prominence of policy ideas. A “policy entrepreneur” is 
an actor in the policymaking process, to include MCs, that is willing “to invest their 
resources…in the hope of a future return [which] might come in the form of policies of which 
they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement” (Kingdon 1984, 
129).  
 The concept of the policy entrepreneur is a natural fit for legislative studies. Since at least 
Fenno’s observational studies (1973), researchers have recognized that some members stand out 
with respect to how they “work harder” and are “more interested” in legislative policymaking 
than they are in other aspects of their jobs. Further, it is well established than MCs are goal-
oriented in the same way as Kingdon described policy entrepreneurs (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 
1974). Thus, characterizing such MCs as entrepreneurs is a straightforward conceptual step, and 
scholars have latched on to the idea. A major contribution that borrowed from this paradigm was 
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Hall’s (1996) study of participation in Congress. His careful unpacking of the concept of 
participation in Congress and MCs’ motivations for it was a significant advance. Hall’s key 
insight was that the intensity of an MC’s legislative activity was just as important as its 
ideological content. Entrepreneurship, to Hall, was simply MCs being high on the scales of 
formal and informal participation in the policy process. Further, Hall echoed Kingdon’s logic, 
pointing out that variation in the intensity of legislative participation was associated with MCs 
pursuing goals like electoral security, following up on their personal interests, and supporting the 
president’s agenda. 
Entrepreneurial behavior by MCs can take a variety of forms. One way that members 
participate in the process is to make legislative speeches that explain their votes and state their 
positions on matters of public policy (Pearson and Dancey 2011; Rocca 2007). Another 
relatively low-cost approach for members to express themselves through the legislative process 
is through cosponsorships, which can serve as a mechanism for position-taking or credit-
claiming, as well as operate intra-institutionally as a form of coalition building (Bernhard and 
Sulkin 2013; Fowler 2006; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Koger 2003; Rocca and Sanchez 2008; 
Wilson and Young 1997). Members also act in the committee markup and amendment processes, 
as MCs hash out the details of proposed legislation as it moves towards becoming law (Hall 
1996). 
Perhaps the most “textbook” way that MCs act as entrepreneurs is to author bills and 
work to pass their agendas into law. Wawro provided a useful definition of this variety of 
entrepreneurship, defining “legislative entrepreneurship” as “a set of activities that a legislator 
engages in, which involves work to form coalitions of other members for the purpose of passing 
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legislation by combining various legislative inputs and issues in order to affect legislative 
outcomes” (Wawro 2001, 4).  Wawro measured this kind of coalition building using an index of 
several indicators of legislative activity, including the number of cosponsors a MC’s bills attract, 
the number of issues included in their legislation, and the expertise of the member as measured 
by the number of appearances as a witness as committee hearings.  
Ultimately, the goal of coalition building is legislative productivity, and there is a 
substantial body of research that has aimed to quantify legislative success and find the personal 
and contextual factors that are associated with it (Frantzich 1979; Hibbing 1991; Cox and Terry 
2008; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Volden and Wiseman 2014). 
Scholars have worked to develop an operationalization of the concept of legislative success, 
generally based on either the total amount or fraction of a MC’s bills that progress to various 
stages of the legislative process. This work underscores the importance of institutional positions 
for MCs’ legislative success, though there are still unanswered questions related to this research 
program, such as whether specialization enhances MCs effectiveness or whether focusing on 
issues that are closely related to the needs to the district supports legislative productivity (see 
Volden and Wiseman 2015, 196). 
Coalition building and enacting legislation are closely related to the process of MCs 
generating their individual legislative agendas. At about the time that Hall drew on Kingdon’s 
ideas for his own work on participation in Congress, Schiller (1995) took a slightly different 
approach for studying entrepreneurship. Rather than focusing on activity in committee, Schiller 
proposed to assess patterns of legislative entrepreneurship in the Senate by focusing on the slate 
of individual senators’ bill sponsorships. Schiller argued that studying sponsorship agendas could 
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provide unique analytical leverage for understanding representation, pointing out that a senator’s 
agenda is a “strong indicator of which issues he or she wants to be associated with and the 
reputation he or she wants to acquire among colleagues” (Schiller 1995, 187). Sulkin (2005; 
2011) built on this idea, outlining a framework for studying legislative behavior through the lens 
of “agenda-based responsiveness.” 
Policy Wonks and the Legislative Process 
Being a “policy wonk” is a kind of entrepreneurial behavior, a form of participation in the 
legislative process that precedes roll calls. It is the behavior of MCs who are policy-intense, act 
as masters of the public business, and are committed to the legislative process. It is likely that 
some of these members are “born” to be wonks, pursuing their interests because that is what they 
want to do. Other times, adopting this pattern of behavior might be driven by an MC’s strategic 
instincts. Of course, these two motivations could also operate jointly.  However, such 
descriptions are all about the intentions and aspirations of MCs. It does not tell us what the 
behavioral markers of being a “policy wonk” are. If we wanted to identify “policy wonks,” how 
could we do it? What is the content of the concept? 
As a first step, consider the lawmaking environment that MCs face. Congress maintains a 
basic level of responsiveness to the demands and needs of the public (Adler and Wilkerson 2012; 
Harbridge 2015; Jones and McDermott 2009; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995), but even in 
the best of times, policymaking in Congress is difficult. As Kingdon described in the same study 
where he advanced the concept of policy entrepreneurship, the optimal conditions for 
policymaking in a legislature are created when there is a convergence of three factors - the 
occurrence of a problem of public importance, the availability of a policy solution to that 
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problem, and a political environment where addressing the problem with the policy is within the 
scope of the political agenda (Kingdon 1984). A similar approach to understanding how 
Congress resolves public problems was articulated in Baumgartner and Jones’s theory of 
punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The 
contribution of Baumgartner and Jones was to articulate how policy processes are characterized 
by periods of stability interrupted by an intense a pattern of policy activity, such that policy 
issues are only intermittently available for action on the public agenda (see also Baumgartner and 
Jones 2015). In addition to the punctuated equilibrium hypothesis, Baumgartner and Jones 
presented a model of organizational decisionmaking that was like Kingdon’s model of the 
policymaking process, including stages of agenda setting, problem definition, proposal and 
debate, and collective choice (Baumgartner and Jones 2005, 38-42). In general, then, the 
literature on the collective policymaking process in Congress describes the chamber as a 
complex information-processing institution, responding to changes in the political environment 
and generating policy intermittently when institutional conditions align. 
The “flow” of congressional policymaking is not the only obstacle that potential policy 
wonks face. MCs put a premium on attending to the specific policy demands of their districts, 
and this creates obstacles to formulating nationally uniform policies (Arnold 1990; Bishin 2009; 
Harden 2016). Indeed, simply because it is a collective, heterogeneous legislative body, 
Congress is naturally prone to being slow and inefficient as a policymaking engine, certainly by 
comparison with the more unified executive branch (Howell and Moe 2016; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1995). Finally, the marked increased in partisan polarization and the overriding focus 
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of the parties on tight races for the control of the chamber are also likely culprits for 
congressional gridlock and combativeness (Binder 2015; Lee 2016).  
Based on this snapshot of Congress as a lawmaking institution, it is no surprise that many 
MCs do not engage heavily with legislating. Put simply, it is a potentially low-yield strategy. 
Most matters related to policymaking are outside of an MCs control. Leadership controls the 
agenda and has a tight hold on information about potential legislation (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Curry 2015). MCs cannot readily anticipate when a policy window will open. Faced with 
such uncertainty, it might be the smartest choice for MCs to avoid spending time and energy 
trying to legislate. Instead, a wiser course of action might be to adopt a more reactive strategy 
(Burden 2007). Members can vote on roll calls when they are scheduled. They can respond to 
requests from their constituents for help with the bureaucracy. The reactive MC can be a 
shapeshifter, adjusting his or her representational profile to suit the situation at hand (Saward 
2014). 
However, this is not enough for some members. Motivated by their own interests and/or 
because they perceive it to be strategically prudent, some members take a proactive stance and 
act on their own accord to introduce their policy ideas and priorities into Congress. For an 
example, refer again to Henry Waxman (D-CA), who might be the prototypical policy wonk. 
Waxman was known for his intense interest in the health and environmental issues in which he 
made his name (Waxman and Green 2009). While the possibilities for legislative success varied 
over the course of his career, Waxman continued to sustain this interest, pushing legislation that 
outlined his objectives and waiting for the right opportunity to emerge. For his tenacity, Waxman 
was ultimately rewarded – after championing health reform throughout the 1980s, Waxman was 
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at the center of the enacting of the Affordable Care Act in 2009 (Rubin 2017, 218-219). For 
another example, take Chris Smith (R-NJ). Based on his intense religious beliefs, Smith came to 
Congress in 1981 with a strong interest in human rights (Barone and Cohen 2009). As he rose in 
seniority and with the Republican takeover of the House, Smith was eventually able to use his 
positions as a senior member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and chair of the 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights to become a prominent champion on 
this issue. Smith eventually saw dozens of his bills related to human rights pass into law (Barone 
and Cohen 2009).  
The essence of Waxman and Smith’s strategy was to construct individual legislative 
agendas around their core policymaking priorities. They both sought partnerships and wanted to 
build coalitions, but even when they could not, these policy wonks kept working on their ideas 
using the tools they had. They were committed participants in the legislative process, 
distinguishing themselves from the reactive approach that many of their colleagues took. In fact, 
this contrast accords with one of Mac Collins’s observations about MCs’ legislative strategies. 
Collins reported to Fenno that “some politicians’ agendas are set by the constituents; other 
politicians’ agendas are set for the constituents” (Fenno 2000, p. 105, emphasis in original). 
All of this is to say that legislative agendas are a useful mechanism for identifying policy 
wonks in Congress. Crafting an agenda offers MCs a way to signal the intensity of their 
policymaking interests, but doing so requires time and resources from MCs (Schiller 1995; 
Sulkin 2011, 27). Thus, the size and breadth of an MC’s legislative agenda is the result of a 
strategic calculation by MCs, signaling their “conscious desire to participate (Sulkin 2011; see 
also Burden 2007). What is on the agenda in Congress determines what MCs represent on behalf 
29 
 
of their constituents – issues that never reach the agenda can never be voted on all. This echoes 
the classic argument about political power from Bachrach and Baratz (1962): that true political 
power is the ability to limit or expand the scope of public decision making (see also 
Schattschneider 1962). In short, it is extremely unlikely that an MC that is interested in 
policymaking would forgo the opportunities that developing an individual legislative agenda 
presents. 
The Legislative Agenda of Policy Wonks 
The agendas of MCs are at the core of what it means to be a master of the public 
business. However, what does the agenda of a policy wonk look like? What are its 
characteristics? I argue that the key to assessing the degree to which an MC is a policy wonk is 
to measure their legislative commitment. Legislative commitment, in turn, has three components: 
intensity, specialization, and consistency. 
First, and most simply, the legislative agenda of a policy wonk should reflect that the 
member is an active legislator. In Congress, where there is so much opportunity for free-riding 
off the work of others and so little time, higher levels of participation indicate that a member is 
engaging in legislative entrepreneurship (Hall 1996). As Sulkin (2011) describes, proactivity is 
also an indicator of other less directly observable legislative behaviors. Thus, the foundation of a 
policy investment strategy of a member of Congress would be the level of intensity of a 
member’s legislative activities. Though perhaps a somewhat noisy measure, other things being 
equal, more activity by an MC equates with greater dedication to using the legislative process to 
achieve his or her goals. 
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However, the level of an MC’s legislative intensity cannot be the only criterion for 
evaluating whether an MC is a policy wonk. Sometimes, two MCs’ agendas indicate a similar 
level of legislative activity, but the content of the agendas suggests an important difference in 
legislative strategy. In fact, this is the case with Jack Flynt and Mac Collins. In his last three 
terms in Congress (the 93rd-95th Congresses), Flynt sponsored a total of 76 bills (Congress.gov).4 
Collins, in his last three terms (the 106th-108th Congresses), introduced 77 (Congress.gov). Both 
these numbers are above the average number of introductions for members (about 10 per 
congress). However, while both members were similar in terms of being more active than 
average, there is a key difference in the agendas of the two MCs. Flynt’s 76 bills were distributed 
across 19 substantive areas, with the largest category consisting of 12 bills related to Armed 
Forces and National Security. Collins’s efforts were more concentrated. He introduced his 77 
bills across only ten substantive areas, with 59 of those bills being about either taxation issues or 
foreign trade and finance (Congress.gov). In short, while Collins and Flynt introduced a similar 
number of bills, the difference in how they constructed their legislative agendas echoes Fenno’s 
observations. Flynt, a member who was interested in addressing the needs of a wide array of his 
constituents, spread his legislative efforts out relatively evenly across many issues. By contrast, 
with his keen focus on representing the intense policy preferences of a majority of his 
constituents, Collins designed his agenda to be more closely focused on a core set of topics. 
                                                     
4 This count of bill sponsorships is the sum of the number of bills that are categorized into 
substantive policy areas on Congress.gov. A few bills for each member are uncategorized, and 
thus are not included this this total. 
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The importance of distinguishing between Flynt and Collins on the basis of the range of 
topics they cover reflects other theoretical work that has explored the value of specialization for 
MCs. If for no other reason than the demands of time, it is not feasible for MCs to be active in 
every area, and thus their decisions about how to distribute their efforts across issues provide 
important information about their policy interests and their legislative strategies (Burden 2007; 
Hall 1996). Because lawmaking is complex, members must work to gather information about 
issues that come before the chamber (Curry 2015; Kingdon 1984; Schiller 1995). Specialization, 
therefore, is a sign that a member’s legislative activities are more than merely symbolic and are 
intended as a genuine spending of resources in pursuit of a legislative objective.  
In addition to intensity and specialization, there is a third characteristic of MC behavior 
that is, logically, a component of legislative commitment – consistency across time. Legislating 
is not a linear process that results in consistent returns on investment or instant gratification. The 
policymaking process often involves a substantial amount of “softening up,” with issues 
percolating in Congress’s issue environment for years or even decades before an alignment of 
institutional factors or a catalyzing event paves the way the progress (Kingdon 1984; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2005). Policy windows or punctuations in policy equilibria are transient, 
and members who want to take advantage of them must be ready to “strike while the iron is hot” 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984). Thus, for a 
member of Congress to usefully engage with the legislative process, it is probable that he or she 
would need to be consistent across time to achieve policy objectives or gain value from investing 
resources in a policymaking project. While a member who jumps from issue to issue might hit 
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the proverbial jackpot in a given term, it is likely that the savvy policy investor adopts a longer-
term strategy. 
As a matter of theory building, these three components – intensity, specialization, and 
consistency – are the building blocks of a strategy of legislative commitment. In turn, legislative 
commitment is what distinguishes policy wonks in Congress. This approach for capturing 
masters of the public business also notably accords with the legislative philosophy of Henry 
Waxman, who I have now twice used as an example of a policy wonk. Looking back at his 
career, Waxman summarized his lawmaking strategy this way: "[S]ustained focus and interest, 
and an ability to seize on openings as they present themselves, will eventually yield success" 
(Waxman and Green 2009, 223).  
Why Become a Wonk, or Not? 
 With a model for the agenda of a policy wonk in hand, I have outlined a conceptual 
approach for studying masters of the public business in a way that has not been done before. In 
the next chapter, I provide an operationalization strategy that uses indicators of intensity, 
specialization, and consistency to generate a legislative commitment score, thereby allowing me 
to identify policy wonks in Congress and the degree to which every MC conforms with this 
model of legislative behavior. However, to this point, there is only half a theory here. While the 
concept of the policy wonk might be clearer now, and there is a claim about how to capture MCs 
who match this concept, to this point I have not addressed the obvious follow-up question: why 
would a MC choose this behavior?  
The basic expectation for why an MC would adopt the profile of a policy wonk follows 
the same logic as MCs’ motivations for other forms of entrepreneurial behavior. As Kingdon 
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described, MCs commit to a legislative agenda now to reap the benefits in the future. Put into the 
classic purposive actor framework for legislative behavior, this means that members will choose 
to commit to legislating with an eye to their electoral security, influence in Congress, post-
Congressional professional ambitions, and their preferences about public policy. While 
reelection is the proximate goal to satisfying all these objectives, members balance the objectives 
against each other and make tradeoffs depending on their priorities (Arnold 1990; Frisch and 
Kelly 2006).  
There are good reasons to think that being a policy wonk can support MCs’ electoral, 
career, and policy goals. One way that investing with this strategy could subsequently pay off 
electorally for a member is by increasing his or her electoral performance with constituents. 
Although the political psychology of voters' evaluations of MCs is complex, citizens have the 
ability to reward or sanction political candidates based on the ideological content of their 
legislative activities and their reputations for competence and integrity (Bishin, Stevens, and 
Wilson 2006; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Hirano and Snyder 2014; McCurley and 
Mondak 1995; Nyhan et al. 2012). Politicians clearly see the value of communicating 
information about their effectiveness to constituents, in expectation of electoral reward 
(Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). Members could improve or cement their standing 
among constituents by using legislative commitment as a means to build up their credentials as a 
serious-minded representative who is working to represent constituents’ policy interests. 
Additionally, committing to lawmaking might also support MCs’ electoral goals by dissuading 
prospective challengers. Because challenger entry in races is strategic (see, e.g., Lawless 2012), a 
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well-defined and developed legislative agenda might drive away challengers who perceive this as 
an electoral strength. 
It is also reasonable to think that being a policy wonk can help a member achieve his or 
her goal of amassing influence in Congress. Power in Congress is partially based on seniority, 
but information is also extremely valuable (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Rank-
and-file members simply cannot learn all the specific details of the legislation that comes before 
them (Curry 2015), and they must rely on other members who specialize to help them make 
decisions. One of the likely purposes of the committee system is to serve this information 
processing role for Congress as a whole (Krehbiel 1992), but the same kind of logic can be 
extended to individual members. When problems arise that need legislative attention, which 
members are likely to hold the cards? Most likely it is the MCs who have a track record of being 
knowledgeable about the issues. If this assumption holds true, then previous legislative 
commitment would be a signal to other members that the investor would serve as a good delegate 
in that information process. Thus, we might expect for members who are interested in gaining 
influence in Congress to invest in the legislative process, in expectation that this activity will be 
subsequently rewarded by their information-seeking colleagues. 
The second broad class of professional ambitions that could be related to acting as a 
master of the public business is the goal of many members to pursue political offices beyond the 
House. As is known to both scholars and the general public alike, many members of Congress 
hope that they will be able to parlay their seat in Congress into Senate seats, governorships, or 
even the presidency (Schlesinger 1966). Progressive ambition is an area of congressional studies 
that has received less focus than others, but it is known that higher office seekers in Congress 
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modify their behavior in several ways vis-à-vis their colleagues. Ambitious MCs modify their 
roll call behavior and other forms of legislative behavior like bill introductions and floor 
speaking (Herrick and Moore 1993; Hibbing 1986; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). They also 
tend to be more specialized over the course of their careers, except they do change their behavior 
to become less specialized as they prepare to campaign (Victor 2010). These changes in behavior 
serve ambitious members by demonstrating their competence and their ability to respond to the 
needs of their constituents, which can consequently support their appeals to a new prospective 
constituency. A history of being committed to legislating could also help a candidate for higher 
office draw support from interest groups or partisan organizations, which may perceive the 
policy-related behavior as a sign that the MC is a quality candidate. In this fashion, being a 
policy wonk can instrumentally serve members who seek to advance in their careers, and this 
suggests that it should have a positive relationship with professional advancement.  
The final motivation that could drive MCs to develop an active, specialized, and 
consistent legislative agenda is that doing so satisfies their own policy interests and their 
orientations towards representation. Even if the relationship between electoral or professional 
interests and policy investment are uncertain, these interests could still provide a systematic 
explanation for variation in MCs’ policy related activities. It is important to remember what 
while MCs are interested in reelection and career advancement, many representatives are there 
because they are genuinely interested in shaping public policy. Some members have individual 
interests in policy issues that stem from their personal backgrounds and are not readily 
attributable to a reelection or professional objectives (Burden 2007). For example, a member 
with a family member who has had chronic illnesses might be interested in health issues for 
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reasons unrelated to any especially strong demand from his or her constituents. Other MCs may 
not have a specific issue that animates them so much as they have a general personal orientation 
towards specializing and attending to the type of detail-oriented work that characterizes the 
policymaking process. 
If MCs are intrinsically motivated to make good public policy, then it makes sense that 
they would commit to legislating by adopting an intense, specialized, and consistent agenda. 
Lawmaking is a long, difficult process. MCs are unlikely to achieve their policy objectives 
without gathering expertise, persisting in their efforts, and taking opportunities to pass their 
agenda into law (Sinclair 2011; Volden and Wiseman 2014). Thus, the way for a member who 
wants to make an impact as a lawmaker is to commit to it. 
Contextual and Individual Factors that Shape Commitment Decisions 
As in other aspects of their job, MCs are likely to invest in lawmaking based on electoral, 
professional, and policy-related interests. Further, there are reasons to believe that legislative 
commitment can contribute to each of these goals. However, this creates an analytical problem. 
If acting like a policy wonk is useful for members as a strategy for achieving their goals, why 
wouldn’t every member devote a substantial degree of their time and resources to legislating? 
Why don’t we see generally high levels of legislative commitment?  
 The reason that Congress is not full of masters of the public business is that even though 
all MCs pursue a common set of objectives, the tradeoff of benefits and costs that flow from 
being one is going to change as a function of political contexts in which MCs operate, along with 
their personal characteristics. To make this more concrete, a senior Republican sitting in the at-
large seat in Alaska (for many years, Don Young) has a much different job in front of him or her 
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than a junior Democrat from a district in suburban Chicago (for example, as of 2018, Raja 
Krishnamoorthi). While these two members similarly want to be reelected, have influence in the 
chamber, and have some impact on public policy, these members are likely to place different 
weights on these objectives and adopt different strategies for how to work towards their goals. 
Extending this kind of analysis to the unique positions and backgrounds of 435 members, it is 
evident that while members are broadly similar, their individual characteristics and the contexts 
in which they operate are going to affect how they act on their common motivations. Again, to 
draw on Hall’s theoretical insight, the content of each MC’s utility function should be infused 
with an acknowledgement of the differences between them (Hall 1996). 
 Perhaps the biggest set of factors that should affect MCs’ investment decisions comes 
from the institutional position that MCs occupy in Congress. Where a member sits in Congress 
has a substantial effect on the costs and benefits of their actions, including those associated with 
being a policy wonk. In short, members in advantageous institutional positions are likely to get 
more out of behaving like a policy wonk than members in less preferable circumstances. 
Members in the majority, who are more senior, and who hold positions of leadership in the 
chamber have a higher likelihood of seeing their legislative ideas advance in the chamber than 
junior, rank-and-file members in the minority (Volden and Wiseman 2014). Thus, we would 
expect members who are in these more preferred positions to adopt the legislative strategy of the 
policy wonk more readily; there is simply more to gain when an MC is in a preferable position.  
Aside from where members sit in Washington, D.C., acting on the motivation to invest in 
lawmaking is also likely contingent on how the member perceives his or her position in the 
district. One potentially important attribute here is the electoral security of the member. There 
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are two competing expectations here. First, it is possible that an electorally secure member would 
have a measure of flexibility to commit to legislating that a threatened member would not. 
Because lawmaking can be taxing, it may be that only a member who thinks he or she is 
electorally secure can bear the risk of diverting resources from maintaining a relationship with 
the district towards acquiring information or drafting bills. However, other expectations are also 
plausible. MCs who are electorally insecure might believe that acting more like a policy wonk 
could have an electoral benefit, if they think that their constituents would respond favorably to 
the member working hard representing their substantive interests. It is also possible that some 
members who do not fear electoral threat might use that flexibility not to enter the lawmaking 
market, but rather withdraw from it, freeing themselves up to focus on activities like supporting 
their party’s organizational efforts or laying the groundwork to run for higher office. Without 
reference to the data, it is not clear which of these mechanisms is operating. 
Electoral security is not the only district-level factor that is likely to affect the costs and 
benefits of investment. Another is the characteristics of a members’ constituency. Some 
members of Congress may sit in a political context where committing to a policy area is an 
electoral good, and thus constituents will be selecting representatives that have either made an 
explicit promise to pursue an issue of local importance or have a natural connection and interest 
in a locally important issue as a function of being of the district (Fenno 1973; Fenno 1978; Fenno 
2000; Sulkin 2011). Aggressively pursuing a policy portfolio may make sense in districts with an 
intense focus on a particular industry or in which a particular social group is predominant, but 
MCs in districts that are heterogeneous with respect to economic interests or in other ways might 
be less apt to become policy-invested because they would need to spread their efforts across a 
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variety of substantive areas. Additionally, while it might be true that citizens generally want their 
representatives to be competent and hardworking, it is not necessarily the case they expect their 
member to be so as a policymaker. Constituencies vary in the demands they place on their 
representatives, and policymaking is not always the most important evaluative criterion that 
citizens use (Harden 2016).  
 Finally, beyond institutional and district-level political context, it should not be forgotten 
that members’ perceptions about the costs and benefits of committing to legislating also 
implicate the personal backgrounds and characteristics of MCs themselves. While members all 
share some degree of interest in affecting public policy, the strength of this interest varies from 
member to member (Burden 2007). Some members likely have close personal connections to 
policy issues that drive them to work in the area or may have orientations that predispose them to 
interests in policy work. Additionally, some members will have a personal skillset and 
background that makes it easier for them to engage in lawmaking, or perhaps do so with greater 
skill. Variation in any of these areas is likely to increase or decrease the cost and benefits that 
members perceive in acting as policy wonks. 
Conclusion 
I have covered substantial ground in this chapter about the theoretical underpinnings of 
legislative commitment. I reviewed both the legislative and non-legislative behavioral options 
that MCs have for how to use their scare time and resources. I then presented a three-pronged 
test for analyzing whether a MC is committed to the legislative process. I argued that 
maintaining an intense, specialized, and consistent agenda is an indication that an MC is 
dedicated to using the tools of lawmaking for achieving his or her goals; in short, these are the 
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three criteria I advocate for identifying what Madison described as “masters of the public 
business.” 
Following this conceptual discussion, I provided a framework for explaining why 
members adopt this strategy. I described the decision to commit to legislating as having two 
parts. First, all members share a set of common electoral, professional, and policy-related 
motivations. However, the individual calculations of MCs about whether to adopt the intense, 
specialized, and consistent agenda that characterizes policy wonks are conditional on a set of 
variables including features of political context and the personal characteristics of members. 
What emerges from this chapter is a series of empirical questions. To identify just a few: 
are members in the majority more likely to commit than those in the minority? Are members 
who act like policy wonks rewarded with promotions in the committee leadership system? Do 
they perform better electorally? Does differential demand for substantive versus descriptive 
representation explain variation in legislative commitment? How do the personal and 
professional backgrounds of members shape their tendencies to invest in this way? I answer 
these questions later, in Chapters 4 and 5. But first, I present a measure of legislative 
commitment that can be used to identify policy wonks. That is the subject of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: Measuring Legislative Commitment 
 
In the previous chapters, I presented my motivation and a conceptual framework for 
studying policy wonks in Congress. As I described it, studying members of Congress that adopt 
intense, specialized, and consistent legislative agendas can provide fresh insight into how 
Congress operates. The Framers expected some representatives to be committed to legislating, 
and the agendas of MCs provide an indication of whether they are adopting this strategy. 
Analyzing MCs through this lens thus addresses theoretically and normatively interesting 
questions about how Congress and its members make law – an especially relevant topic at a time 
when the institution is subject to intense scrutiny. 
 The objective of this chapter is to describe my operationalization strategy for capturing 
legislative commitment and present some initial findings about the distribution of this pattern of 
behavior across MCs and across Congresses. My approach uses MCs’ bill introductions to 
capture the three components of legislative commitment that I described in Chapter 2. Using 
different indicators of intensity, specialization, and consistency, I describe how these aspects of 
MCs’ legislative agendas vary across members. Then, I examine how these three components 
relate to one another. Finally, I show how I combine scores for each of these into a composite 
“legislative commitment score” that provides a continuous measure of how much the behavior of 
an MC conforms with the theoretical model of a master of the public business. By describing the 
contours of policy wonks’ behavioral strategy in this chapter, I set the stage for the analysis of its 
antecedents and consequences in the chapters to come.  
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Capturing Legislative Commitment with Bill Introductions 
My analysis draws on data from the 101st through the 110th Congresses. This period 
allows me to examine legislative behavior in many different institutional configurations, as it 
encompasses shifts in party control of the House, redistricting cycles, and turnover of 
presidential administrations. It is also an important time period to study because it covers pivotal 
changes in Congress. The 1994 Republican takeover and the continued ideological sorting of the 
parties led to the stronger, more centralized party leadership and the partisan polarization that 
characterize Congress today.  
To capture MCs’ legislative agendas, I study their slates of bill introductions. My choice 
here follows a long line of research that relies on bill introductions as a mechanism for studying 
legislative behavior. Hibbing (1991) used a set of statistical measures of bill introductions 
proposed by Matthews (1960) to evaluate the “legislative activity career” of members, describing 
MCs’ legislative intensity, specialization, and effectiveness. Schiller (1995) used bill 
introductions to study how contextual and political forces shaped senators’ legislative agendas, 
and Wawro (2001) expanded on this work, using the content of MCs’ sponsored bills as a 
component of his “legislative entrepreneurship score” tracking the coalition building efforts of 
MCs. Sulkin (2005; 2011) used bill introductions in studies of issue uptake and promise keeping 
in congressional campaigns, and Bernhard and Sulkin (2018) also relied on them as part of their 
study of MCs’ legislative styles. In short, scholars examining several different facets of MCs’ 
behavior have found bill introductions to be a suitable mechanism for assessing legislative 
activity.  
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Bill introductions are a good match for the theoretical framework I presented for studying 
policy wonks. Being a master of the public business is fundamentally about MCs actively and 
consistently inserting their preferred policies into the legislative process in Congress, and the 
essence of a bill introduced into Congress is the underlying policy ideas it contains. The ideas 
embedded in a sponsored bill go into the “primeval soup” of Congress’s policy environment, 
beginning or supporting the “softening up” of policy communities and setting the stage for 
broader debate on the issue (Kingdon 1984, 134). MCs can use bill introductions to send a 
strong, clear, persistent signal of their policy preferences (Sulkin 2005; 2011). With that, 
members can begin to accrue the benefits of investing in lawmaking – for instance, strengthening 
their professional reputation with their colleagues, communicating to constituents that they are 
aggressively pursuing the issues that matter to them, and increasing the likelihood that they will 
get preferred policies enacted into law. Thus, bill introductions are the primary currency of 
policy wonks and should be at the core of identifying them.  
Bill introductions can serve as a measure of a MCs’ legislative commitment because 
introducing legislation implies that MCs are spending their time and energy in anticipation of 
future payoffs. Even though outside actors may assist in bill drafting, introducing legislation is 
costly for MCs. As Wawro (2001) observes, “Primary sponsorship typically involves more than 
just signing one’s name to a piece of legislation and dropping it in the ‘hopper’” (27) (see also 
Schiller 1995). Members of Congress must coordinate with their own staffs during the process of 
developing legislation, and members who want to communicate with their colleagues and 
constituents about their legislative work must develop familiarity with the substance of it; to do 
otherwise makes it harder to advocate for and advertise their work. Introducing legislation also 
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requires that representatives engage in an “intelligence gathering process” in which they work 
with other legislators and interest groups to get feedback and build support (Schiller 1995). 
Introducing legislation is not simply a matter of jotting down ideas or cribbing from an interest 
group, but rather implies a more extensive process of collecting, evaluating, and distributing 
information, all of which consumes a MC’s extraordinarily limited time. 
The fact that bills differ in length and complexity does not invalidate introductions as a 
measure of activity. While it is possible that a long, complex piece of legislation passing out of 
the House is a signal of greater policy investment than a short, simple bill, there are reasons to 
question whether this is systematically true. Additionally, aside from identifying purely 
commemorative legislation, there are few options for making an exogenously-determined 
judgment about a bill’s substantiveness beyond this distinction (but see Volden and Wiseman 
2014). Further, if a bill is “simple,” a MC could still need to do research on the implications of a 
relatively basic policy provision and spend political capital persuading his or her colleagues and 
constituents to lend their support, even though the drafting process is not time-consuming. 
It would also be misleading to identify a bill as unimportant based on its progress towards 
becoming law. This is due to the round-about nature of the legislative process. With the rise of 
unorthodox lawmaking and leadership-driven legislative strategies, a member’s policy ideas may 
ultimately make it into law through bills which are not attached to the individual member, even 
though the member introduced the original legislative language (Sinclair 2011). For example, in 
their study of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), Wilkerson, Smith, 
and Stramp (2015) showed through a computational text analysis that the final legislation was 
composed of portions of hundreds of bills introduced by members of Congress. Less than 15% of 
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introduced bills ever receive action in the committee stage (Volden and Wiseman 2014), and it is 
impossible at present to know how many ideas embodied in introduced legislation ultimately 
make it into law. Legislative effectiveness is an important attribute of members, but it risks being 
seriously misleading as a means for assessing the importance of a bill.  
The difficulty of creating objective measures of bill substantiveness and accounting for 
the legislative process point away from attempting to discriminate amongst bill introductions on 
these grounds. A “small” idea that does not itself become law can still have major implications, 
and a “big” bill may not reflect the effort of an individual member of Congress. This response is 
related to the critique that some bill introductions are entirely symbolic, an exercise in position-
taking by MCs with no intention of following up (Mayhew 1974). It is of course possible that 
some members of Congress introduce bills insincerely. However, as with judging complexity or 
importance, there is no way to evaluate this systematically (see Sulkin 2011, 32; Hall 1996). 
Simply because a bill does not advance towards becoming law does not suggest that the bill itself 
is symbolic, especially given the low rate of legislative efficiency.  
There is also an important practical consideration that supports using bill introductions. 
As Wawro (2001) notes, a desirable way to study legislative participation might be that taken by 
Hall (1996), who conducted an intense study of MCs’ participation in legislative mark-up, 
reviewing thousands of pages of transcripts of committee meetings. Qualitative research like 
Fenno’s classic studies are similarly desirable, giving a rich sense of the motivations, 
opportunities, and obstacles of members over the course of their careers (Fenno 1973; Fenno 
1978; Fenno 2000). However, despite their appeal, gathering data in this way is enormously 
expensive in terms of the researcher’s time and resources. Hall and Fenno needed months in the 
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archive and the field to get their results. If we want to learn about legislative behavior, 
complementing such qualitative work with quantitative studies is the best way to ensure that 
legislative research is both theoretically rich and broad in scope. 
Indicators of the Components of Legislative Commitment 
 Establishing bill introductions as the “raw material” provides a starting point for 
measuring legislative commitment. To take the next step towards an operationalization, in the 
sections that follow I specify how I use introductions to capture each component of legislative 
commitment: intensity, specialization, and consistency. 
Intensity 
To be a policy wonk, a member must be engaged with introducing ideas into policy 
debates in Congress. As I described above, the institutional mechanism for this is proposing 
legislation. Anecdotally, it comes as no surprise that some members are more active or prolific in 
this regard than others. Representatives introduce an average of about 10 bills per Congress, but 
there is wide variation around this central tendency. For example, from the 101st to the 110th 
Congresses, Don Young (R-AK) introduced at least 20 and as many as 55 bills per year. 
Similarly active was Bob Filner (D-CA), who from the 103rd to the 110th Congresses introduced 
no fewer than 11 bills (in his first term) and as many as 48 (by the 110th). On the low end, 
however, other members are much less active. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) from the 102nd to the 110th 
Congresses introduced an average of only four bills per term. From the 101st to the 107th 
Congresses, Norman Sisisky (D-VA) averaged less than two bills per term.  
To tabulate the number of bills that MCs introduce in each term, I draw on Sulkin’s data 
on bill sponsorships (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). I measure legislative intensity per term by 
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taking the sum of all bills MCs introduce during that Congress, except for bills that are related to 
government operations.5 Again, the approach of using the number of bill introductions as a proxy 
for legislative intensity leads to some tradeoffs. However, as a measure of the quantity of ideas 
that a member inserts into the broader policy debate in Congress, the measure captures a key 
element of the concept of commitment.  
Figure 3.1: Boxplots of MCs’ Bill Introductions Per Term 
 
 
                                                     
5 Government operations bills include those that cover “subjects like congressional structure and 
organization, use of the Capitol for ceremonial events, nominations and appointments, and the 
like” (Sulkin 2011, 49). 
 
Note: Figure displays boxplots of the total number of 
introductions per term (excluding government operations 
bills, see footnote 5) for members in the 101st to the 110th 
Congress. 
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The number of bills introduced is an observation at the member-term level. I have 4,410 
term observations of 1,038 unique members across these ten congresses. Figure 3.1 displays 
boxplots for the number of bills introduced per members, grouped by congress. As I mentioned 
above, while the median number of bills introduced in a term is eight and the mean is 11, there is 
wide variation in legislative intensity, from a minimum of zero bills in a term to a maximum of 
118 bills introduced, a feat accomplished by Rob Andrews (D-NJ) in the 109th Congress. This 
generates a strongly right-skewed distribution. 
Specialization 
A member who introduces very few bills is likely less committed to the legislative 
process than a member who introduces legislation at the average rate among MCs. However, 
aside from ruling out very inactive members, drawing inferences about whether a member is a 
master of the public business and a policy wonk from a simple count of introduced bills is risky. 
A member who introduces ten bills may be investing more resources than a member who 
introduces five, but what if the member with the higher absolute number of bills spreads his or 
her attention across ten different substantive areas? The member with the more focused agenda is 
sending a clearer signal about his or her policy preferences. The more focused member also 
likely has more at stake in working on his or her bills than the member that spreads his or her 
efforts out across many different substantive areas. In short, a given magnitude of legislative 
intensity is made more meaningful when paired with a measure of specialization. 
As with a count of bill introductions, simply browsing through the records of members of 
Congress makes clear that there is variation in how specialized MCs are as lawmakers. Some 
representatives are very active legislatively but spread their activities out over a wide range of 
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issues. Patsy Mink (D-HI) introduced 227 bills from 1990 to 2002 but did so across 16 different 
substantive areas. Her most common legislative agenda topic, defense and foreign policy issues, 
comprised only 20% of her total legislative activity. Similarly, Nita Lowey (D-NY), introduced 
319 pieces of legislation from 1990 to 2000. Her biggest issue was health, but it only constituted 
20% of her legislative agenda. Other MCs are much more focused than Mink or Lowey. Lane 
Evans (D-IL) was an active legislator with 151 bills introduced from 1990 through 2006, but 
80% of his legislation focused on military and veterans’ issues. Similarly, Bud Shuster (R-PA) 
introduced 92 bills from 1989 to 2009, and he dedicated about two-thirds of his legislative work 
to issues related to jobs and infrastructure. Shuster’s second most common area was 
environmental issues, but this constituted only 13% of his total legislative agenda. Thus, while 
Mink and Lowey were more active, they were much less focused than Evans or Shuster.  
While this kind of snapshot of a few members’ legislative habits confirms that there is 
variation in specialization, capturing this systematically requires making research design choices. 
There is no dominant measure of legislative specialization in the literature on congressional 
behavior, although scholars have suggested several different approaches. Matthews (1960) 
measured specialization by calculating the proportion of legislation introduced by senators that 
was referred to the two committees receiving the largest amount of sponsored legislation from 
the senator. Researchers adopted this basic approach, with minor modifications, in several 
subsequent studies (Adler and Wilkerson 2005; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-
Chapman 2003; Hibbing 1991). Other scholars have suggested different techniques for 
measuring specialization, such as Gilligan and Krehbiel’s (1997) proposed measure based on 
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cosponsorship, or Victor’s (2010) idea to measure specialization using the substantive content of 
floor speeches. 
For my study of legislative commitment, I measure specialization by using Shannon’s 
Entropy (Shannon’s H). Initially developed in thermodynamics as a measure of the diffusion of 
heat (Shannon 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949), legislative scholars have more recently 
adopted Shannon’s H as a measure of “attention diversity” (Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas 2014; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2015).6 Shannon’s H is a scaled probability of the likelihood that any 
two units pulled from a collection of units drawn from different categories will be of the same 
category. In the context of political attention – or in my application, legislative specialization – it 
is calculated by “multiplying the proportion of the agenda that each issue…receives by the 
natural log of that proportion, then [taking] the negative sum of those products” (Boydstun, 
Bevan, and Thomas 2014).7 In equation form, this is: 
Shannon's H =  − ∑ 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) * ln
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑝(𝑥𝑖) 
                                                     
6 Shannon’s H also has a long history of use in ecology to measure biological diversity 
(Magurran 2004). It is closely related to another value, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, which 
has been used in several political science contexts. Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas argue 
persuasively that Shannon’s H has several properties that make it more desirable as a measure of 
attention diversity, or in my application, individual MCs’ legislative specialization. 
7 Because the natural log of 0 is undefined, for those issue areas where a member introduces no 
bill, when 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) is 0, I use ln(0.0000001). 
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Shannon’s H captures entropy, measuring the concentration and diffusion of categorical 
information (Boydstun, Bevan, and Smith 2014). For my study, I calculate Shannon’s H by 
drawing on Sulkin’s data on bill introductions (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). Sulkin uses a coding 
scheme to assign every bill introduced by a member of Congress into one of 17 substantive 
categories.8 Thus, to calculate Shannon’s H, I use the proportion of bills introduced by the 
member in each term in these 17 substantive categories.9 This provides me with a measure of the 
entropy of a members’ introduction activities. A member of Congress is a specialist if his or her 
introduction activities have a low level of entropy, and a generalist if he or she has a high level of 
entropy. Shannon’s H increases as entropy increases, so higher values of Shannon’s H indicate 
that a MCs’ agenda is increasingly dispersed across issues, i.e., less specialized. 
                                                     
8 These categories are: “agriculture, budget, campaign finance and government reform, 
children’s issues (child care, family law, family leave, etc.), civil rights, consumer issues 
(consumer safety, fraud, credit cards, etc.), corporate regulation, crime, defense and foreign 
policy, education, environment, health, jobs and infrastructure, Medicare, moral issues, Social 
Security, taxes, and welfare” (Sulkin 2011, 48). An eighteenth category, governmental 
operations, refers to bills on “subjects like congressional structure and organization, use of the 
Capitol for ceremonial events, nominations and appointments, and the like” (Sulkin 2011, 49). I 
do not include government operations bills in my count of total introductions, my calculation of 
Shannon’s H, or in the consistency calculations presented below. 
9 For members who introduce no bills, there is no value for Shannon’s H, so I code the value as 
missing. 
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Although Shannon’s H is easy to calculate in this way, it can be difficult to interpret at 
first glance, so it is useful to provide an illustration. Consider a hypothetical set of members with 
agendas spanning from one to all 17 issue areas, introducing an equal number of bills in each 
issue are. With this number of issues, the maximum possible value of Shannon’s H is 2.83. This 
would occur when a member introduces the same number of bills across every issue area. The 
minimum value is zero, which would occur when the member introduces exclusively in one issue 
area. Figure 3.2 shows this range of values graphically. A member who introduces evenly across 
three areas would have an entropy score of about one, a member who introduces evenly in five 
areas would have an entropy score of about 1.6, and so on up to the maximum spread across 17 
issues.  
Figure 3.2: Sample Shannon’s H Values 
 
 
 
 With this sample distribution as a reference point, Figure 3.3 displays boxplots for the 
Shannon’s H values for MCs’ agendas, grouped by Congress. The maximum value for the 
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Note: Figure displays the hypothetical value of Shannon’s H for a member-term when the 
member introduces bills evenly across increasing issue areas. 
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dataset is 2.48, which is short of the theoretical maximum (because there is no member who 
introduces equally across all 17 substantive areas). The mean of Shannon’s H is 1.26 and the 
median is 1.33, with small fluctuations in these values across Congress. Substantively, values in 
the 1.3 to 1.5 range would correspond with the entropy level for a member who introduces 
evenly across four or five different issue areas. This makes sense, as the median number of areas 
a member of Congress introduces per term is five.  
Figure 3.3: Boxplots of MCs’ Shannon’s H Scores Per Term 
 
 
 
Consistency 
With measures of intensity and specialization, I have two components of legislative 
commitment in place. However, there is another piece still missing. To be a policy wonk, 
Note: Figure displays boxplots of Shannon’s H values for 
members in the 101st to 110th Congresses, calculating the 
value using MCs’ slate of bill introductions. 
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lawmakers must be not only active and focused, but they should give sustained attention to issues 
over time. For members to stake out a reputation for investing in lawmaking, they must work in 
an area consistently. While measuring specialization helps to clarify whether active members are 
focused legislators, measuring consistency helps to ensure that members are not “jumping 
around” and focusing on different issues across terms. Thus, consistency is the third leg of policy 
investment.  
 As with intensity and specialization, an examination of legislators’ histories of 
introducing bills shows members vary in how consistent they are. From the 104th to the 110th 
Congresses, John Shadegg (R-AZ) intermittently legislated across a variety of issues, introducing 
a bill focused on Social Security in the 107th Congress, then skipping that area in the 108th, then 
introducing another piece of Social Security legislation in the 109th. He displayed a similar 
pattern in the areas of crime and consumer protection. Nydia Velazquez (D-NY) did the same in 
the area of welfare law, introducing three bills on the subject in the 104th, 107th, and 109th 
Congresses but not in others. Although all members do this to an extent, a review of members’ 
substantive agendas suggests that some members are more prone to adopt this type of spotty, 
inconsistent introduction pattern than others. 
 I am not aware of previous work in legislative behavior that attempts to capture this 
concept of legislative consistency. To assess it systematically, I use the Bray-Curtis index. This 
index is a measure of similarity adopted by biologists to compare species distribution across 
geographic areas (Magurran 2004). In the context of comparing two sets of organisms belonging 
to multiple different species, it is calculated by dividing the sum of the lower of the two 
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abundances for species found in both sets, multiplied by two, by the sum of the individuals in 
both sets. In equation form, this is:  
Bray-Curtis Index =
2𝑗𝑁
𝑁𝑎 + 𝑁𝑏
 
To put this in terms of bill introductions, imagine that a representative introduced six bills 
in term t, with three bills in Area A, two in Area B, and one in Area C. Then, in term t + 1, the 
member introduces three bills in Area A, one in Area B, and zero in Area C. The value of the 
numerator for the Bray-Curtis formula would be 8 and the denominator would be 10, resulting in 
a Bray-Curtis index of 0.8. This is illustrated in Table 3.1. The Bray-Curtis index can be thought 
of as a measure of how much of a member’s substantive agenda “carries over” from term to 
term. The value is zero when a member does not carry over any substantive category from term 
to term, and one when the member’s slate of bill introductions is distributed identically across 
issue areas from one congress to another.  
Table 3.1: Example Bray-Curtis Calculation       
    
  Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 
Term t 3 2 1 
Term t + 1 3 1 0 
Does the MC legislate in the area at t and t + 1? Yes Yes No 
Lesser of the number of bills introduced at t and t +1 3 1 -- 
    
Sum of the lesser of the number of bills introduced at t and t + 1  4  
Sum of all bills in both years  10  
Bray-Curtis Index   0.8   
Note: Table displays the steps for calculating the Bray-Curtis index for each member of Congress based on the 
areas in which they legislate. 
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I calculate the Bray-Curtis index for each member-term observation in my dataset, using 
Sulkin’s categorization of bill introductions across the 17 topics.10 Figure 3.4 displays boxplots 
for the value for all member-term observations grouped by Congress. The median Bray-Curtis 
value is 0.55 and the mean is 0.51. 
Figure 3.4: Boxplots of MCs’ Bray-Curtis Index Per Term 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 It is impossible to calculate a value for the Bray-Curtis index for members in the 101st 
Congress in my dataset or for any first term MC, because I do not have the data for the 100th 
Congress or the data do not exist. Thus, there are no Bray-Curtis index values for observations 
from the 101st Congress or for first-term members.  
Note: Figure displays boxplots of the Bray-Curtis index 
for members in the 101st to 110th Congresses. 
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Identifying Masters of the Public Business 
 Thus far, I have presented approaches for capturing the intensity, specialization, and 
consistency of MCs legislative agendas using bill introductions. Scores on these dimensions are 
the building blocks for an approach to identify masters of the public business in Congress. The 
next step is to explain how to use the measures to do so. This requires both theoretical and 
empirical elaboration. 
 The simplest way to identify which MCs are policy wonks using these three measures 
would be to take members that are high on all three of these scores and characterize them as 
such. These Madisonian masters of the public business would introduce a higher than average 
number of bills, and their agendas would be more specialized and consistent than average. This 
simple approach works to the extent that it creates a small subset of members that can be 
categorized as policy wonks. There are 3,303 member-terms for which I can generate 
commitment scores. Out of those, 253 member-terms have scores for intensity, specialization, 
and consistency that are all above the median for each of these components (pooled across 
congresses), consisting of 158 unique members. However, while a simple cutoff for making a 
dichotomous classification is satisfying in its simplicity, it is problematic in other ways. Looking 
at the data, there is no obvious point at which to divide wonks from non-wonks. This suggests 
the need for generating a continuous measure of legislative commitment that could be assigned 
to every MC in every term. The measure would identify MCs that are high on all three 
components at the top of the scale and give MCs lower scores as they became less intense, 
specialized, or consistent.  
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This is an appealing goal, but in practice there are some challenges to achieving it. Some 
MCs are intense, specialized, and consistent, but these are not mutually reinforcing 
characteristics in Congress. As members become more legislatively active, they tend to spread 
their attention out across topics. This increases entropy, thereby reducing an MC’s level of 
specialization. Similarly, as members become more specialized, they reduce the number of areas 
over which they legislate. This in turn decreases how persistent they are in legislating in the 
same areas across congresses, because reducing the number of areas they legislate in will lead to 
members dropping some issues from their agendas entirely. 
 Because of this pattern, intensity, specialization, and consistency are not positively 
associated with each other. In fact, they work at cross purposes. In Table 3.2, I provide a 
correlation matrix for MCs’ scores on each of these components. To generate this table, I 
transformed the measures in several ways. First, to account for the skewed distribution of bill 
introduction activity, I took the natural log of this measure. Second, I normalized the logged 
count of bill introductions, the Shannon’s H value, and the Bray-Curtis index for each member-
term observation across all Congresses. Then, I multiplied the scaled Shannon’s H score by -1, 
so that higher values indicated greater specialization (as opposed to greater entropy). 
As Table 3.2 indicates, there are moderately strong to strong correlations between 
intensity, specialization, and consistency. Lawmaking intensity is negatively correlated with 
specialization and positively correlated with consistency, while specialization and consistency 
are negatively correlated. While the relationships between specialization and consistency and 
intensity and consistency are only weak or moderate, there is a strong negative correlation 
between intensity and specialization. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of the Components of Legislative 
Commitment 
 Intensity Specialization Consistency 
Intensity 1   
Specialization -0.75 1  
Consistency 0.45 -0.34 1 
Note: Cell entries are Pearson correlation coefficients for the components of legislative 
commitment. 
 
 This pattern of correlations creates some complications for constructing a measure of 
legislative commitment. The most interesting MCs are those who defy the general tendency and 
have agendas that score highly on all three components. As policy wonks, these members engage 
in a behavior of normative interest that does not follow typical patterns of legislative behavior. 
However, simple approaches for creating a scale, like adding or multiplying the scores together, 
would lead to unusual results. MCs with very high scores on intensity but lower scores for 
specialization might end up with a higher score than MCs who are specialized and consistent but 
had a smaller agenda. This would lead to problematic misidentifications, because members with 
very large agendas that are not specialized or consistent could potentially have a higher score 
than members who sponsor a more moderate amount of legislation but whose agenda is focused 
on a core set of policy priorities. In other words, legislative position-takers would score higher 
than members whose behavior more closely resembles that of a policy wonk.  
 My solution to this problem is both theoretical and empirical, and it involves several 
measurement choices. My first step is to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. Thinking 
about the components of being a policy wonk, specialization and consistency are different 
concepts and both need to be measured separately. However, in another sense, specialization and 
consistency are both attributes of a larger theoretical construct: diversity. A member with a more 
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varied agenda that is unstable across time is addressing a wider “diversity” of policy interests 
than a MC that hammers away at the same issue term after term. Specialization can be re-
interpreted as “instantaneous diversity” (diversity of the agenda in a single term) while 
consistency can be thought of as “temporal diversity” (diversity across time). Reimagined in this 
way, a straightforward way to combine specialization and consistency into a single dimension of 
agenda “diversity” is to add a constant to both measures so that the minimum value equals one, 
then multiplying the two values together.11 This creates a composite value that reflects the joint 
                                                     
11 I borrow this approach from literature on mathematical ecology. There is a substantial 
literature in this field about how to measure diversity (Jost 2006; Lande 1996; Magurran 2004). I 
take the approach of Whittaker (1972). Whittaker conceptualized the overall biological diversity 
of an environment, called “gamma” diversity, into two components, “alpha” diversity and “beta” 
diversity. In Whittaker’s language, alpha diversity meant the diversity among species in spatial 
sub-units of the environment, and beta diversity meant the change in species composition and 
abundance across the environmental gradient. Whittaker calculated gamma diversity as the 
product of multiplying alpha diversity and beta diversity. I do the same here. 
Setting the bottom value for specialization and consistency at one avoids an unintuitive 
outcome. If the member had a specialization score or consistency score or 0, the resultant 
concentration score for the term would be zero as well. This would cause a member who is 
highly specialized in a term but legislated on different issues than the last term to receive a 
concentration score of zero. Setting the bottom value for specialization and consistency at one 
prevents this. 
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quality of how specialized and consistent a MC’s agenda is. I call this composite score “agenda 
concentration.”12  
My final step for identifying policy wonks is to the calculate a legislative commitment 
score as follows. First, for each member-term observation, I calculate the Pythagorean distance 
from the origin of an intensity-by-concentration plot to the point of that observation in the two-
dimensional plot space. Then, I subtract from that value the absolute value of the difference 
between the scores for intensity and concentration. Subtracting this absolute value operates as a 
penalty term, reducing the score for members that dilute (or, in some cases, over concentrate) 
their agendas as they increase their legislative activity.  
This approach yields intuitively reasonable results. In Figure 3.5, I display two 
scatterplots with intensity and agenda concentration plotted against each for observations in my 
dataset. The left panel includes all observations. As the plot suggests, these values are slightly 
negatively correlated with each other (r = -0.18). The right panel is a sample of only 150 
observations, to make the figure more readable. In the right panel, the size of the diamonds 
corresponds with increasing legislative commitment scores.  
As the different sizes of the diamonds in the right panel indicates, this approach for 
calculating legislative commitment does not over-reward MCs for being very concentrated and 
having a small agenda or very intense with a very unconcentrated agenda. This approach is not 
                                                     
12 The term “agenda concentration” was used by Boydstun, Bevan, and Smith (2014) in their 
application of Shannon’s H to studying attention diversity. There, it referred only to a Shannon’s 
H value; here it is the combination of instantaneous and temporal diversity. 
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perfect, as members in the lower right and upper left of the plot would have similar commitment 
scores but with differently designed agendas. However, it succeeds in making the critical 
distinction between MCs that are wonks and not, and it does not misidentify members that are 
very high on only one component. 
Figure 3.5: Scatterplots of Intensity and Concentration
 
 
 
These plots are helpful in thinking about how to conceptualize policy wonks in Congress. 
In the lower right of the plots, the members are active lawmakers, but they have unspecialized 
agendas. These types of members might be characterized as position-takers who use legislation 
to stake out their policy preferences but do not organize their agenda around a set of core issues, 
as a policy wonk would. The left side of the figure is populated by members who are not active 
Note: Figures display scatterplots of intensity and concentration for member-term observations from the 
102nd to the 110th Congresses. The left panel includes all observations. The right panel is a random sample 
of 150 observations. In the right panel, increasing diamond size corresponds with an increasing legislative 
commitment score. 
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lawmakers, likely choosing to direct their energies towards other representational activities.13 
Hamilton and Madison’s masters of the public business would be in the upper right quadrant; 
these members are active lawmakers that have concentrated legislative agendas. Notably, every 
member-term observation in my dataset that has scores above the median for intensity, 
specialization, and consistency has a legislative commitment score above the third quartile.  
Figure 3.6 displays a set of boxplots of MCs’ legislative commitment scores per term, 
grouped by Congress. The median score is 1.96 and the mean is 2.00, and the standard deviation 
is 1.00. Legislative commitment is somewhat “sticky,” with commitment in a term being 
correlated with commitment in the previous term at r = 0.42.  
Figure 3.6: Boxplots of MCs’ Legislative Commitment Score Per Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 These inactive members might be characterized as policy amateurs or policy dilettantes, but 
the label is not critical to my analysis. 
Note: Figure displays boxplots of the Bray-Curtis 
index for members in the 101st to 110th Congresses. 
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Who are these Members? 
 The methodology I have outlined provides a way to systematically identify when 
members of Congress are committed to legislating. The measure works by assessing the 
intensity, specialization, and consistency of MCs’ legislative agendas. Indeed, reviewing the 
careers of a few members with repeatedly high scores on the measure provides further examples 
of MCs with notable policymaking reputations. Along with Henry Waxman and the other 
examples I have used so far, there are members like Jim Oberstar (D-MN). Oberstar was the long 
time representative of the Iron Range of northern Minnesota. Described as “part scholar and part 
Iron Range street fighter, part pothole-filling ward healer and part workaholic,” Oberstar was, 
like Waxman, elected in 1974 (Barone and Cohen 2007, 909). During his career, Oberstar was 
known for his work on transportation issues, and he was an important figure on the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. From that position, Oberstar worked on major 
national spending bills, but he also attended to local needs, directing millions of dollars to 
Minnesota (Barone and Cohen 2007). 
 Most media coverage in recent years of Lamar Smith (R-TX) would not make paint him 
as a policy wonk. Lately, he has been best known to casual observers for his skepticism about 
climate change. But outside of that issue, Smith has been an active and focused legislator. Since 
he was elected to a safe Republican seat in 1986, Smith has not been a major presence in his 
district, but he has taken up several critical legislative projects (Mervis and Cornwall 2017). 
Smith earned praise from the intellectual property community (including Democratic lobbyists) 
for his work with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) on a revamping of the patent system (Mervis 
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and Cornwall 2017), and he also took on a central role in the ongoing efforts to reform the 
immigration system (Barone et al. 2013). 
 Michael Bilirakis (R-FL) made his name in Congress by working on health issues. Along 
with passing bills in his own name, Bilirakis also saw his ideas spread through the Republican 
Party. In the mid-1990s, Bilirakis introduced legislation to make health insurance portable, but 
then withdrew the bill during the 1994 healthcare debate (Barone and Cohen 2001). In 1996, a 
nearly identical idea was passed as part of the Kennedy-Kassebaum Act, which implemented 
HIPAA (Barone and Cohen 2001). Similarly, Bilirakis sponsored legislation that would 
implement expanded prescription drug benefits for poor Medicare recipients. Bilirakis’s proposal 
became the plan of the Republican Party and the Bush Administration (Barone and Cohen 2001). 
 Finally, take as an example Diana DeGette (D-CO). In 1996, DeGette took over the seat 
long held by Pat Schroeder, a prominent feminist in Congress. DeGette was described as 
“organizationally adept” and “legislatively creative,” and she used these gifts to good effect 
(Barone and Cohen 2013). Like Bilirakis, DeGette made her mark in health policy. She showed a 
willingness to work with Republicans on issues, and she was persistent over time. She first led 
the charge to expand federal funds for stem cell research in the mid-2000s, but vetoes from 
President Bush blocked her bipartisan legislation (Barone and Cohen 2013). Ultimately, DeGette 
did not even get legislative credit when this policy was enacted, as President Obama ended up 
using his executive authority to expand federal stem cell research (Barone and Cohen 2013). It is 
also notable that DeGette, while she pursued issues tenaciously, also balanced this with political 
ambition, as she for many years angled for positions of party leadership in the Democratic 
Caucus (Barone and Cohen 2013). 
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 In conjunction with the other examples I have presented so far, these short profiles give a 
sense of what the career of a highly committed legislator looks like. Members of both parties, 
from all regions of the country and with a wide variety of substantive interests, make the 
decision to commit to their legislative agendas. Sometimes, the public personas of MCs do not fit 
with their behavior on the Hill, or their work may be little known to those outside a small policy 
community. Other times, members’ work is not immediately rewarded. Further, members 
commit to legislating even while they balance other objectives, like directing resources to their 
districts or working to advance within the House. However, despite these differences, the key 
similarity of these members is that they are acting as representatives in the way Madison and 
Hamilton imagined: as committed legislators. 
Conclusion and Look Ahead 
The process I have outlined in this chapter succeeds in identifying members who are 
distinctive in their policy-related legislative behavior. For at least some period of their service in 
Congress, these members were active, specialized, and consistent lawmakers, selecting a pattern 
of legislating which goes against the general tendencies of members. Choosing this behavioral 
profile is a sign that members are committed to the legislative process.  
 Simply knowing that these policy wonks exist and reviewing some of their stories, 
however, is only a small piece of the puzzle. The results of this chapter suggest many more 
questions than they answer. First, aside from their legislative behavior, what are the 
characteristics of masters of the public business?  Are they systematically different from other 
members of Congress? If there are systematic differences, can this help researchers and citizens 
to understand the factors that drive members to become policy wonks? What changes in political 
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context or events during members’ careers affect members’ decisions to invest in lawmaking? 
Finally, what are the consequences of members’ decisions? I begin to address these in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: The Who, When, and Where of Legislative Commitment  
 
In the last chapter, I argued that adopting an intense, specialized, and consistent 
legislative agenda is a sign that a member of Congress is a policy wonk, and I developed an 
approach for generating a legislative commitment score based on indicators of each of these 
components. The legislative commitment score identifies members who are dedicated to the 
lawmaking process and have earned reputations for legislating in a variety of substantive areas. 
As I described in Chapter 1, studying such members can provide insight about how MCs 
operate as masters of the public business. Madison and Hamilton believed that members 
behaving in this way was critical to Congress’s purpose, and the legislative commitment score is 
a tool for investigating the characteristics of MCs who serve in this role and the contexts in 
which it is most common. Generally, based on the framework in Chapter 2, I anticipate that 
MCs’ decisions to behave as policy wonks will be driven by the same kind of informal cost-
benefit analysis that drives much of their legislative behavior. Members of Congress are likely to 
commit to lawmaking when they believe that doing so will help them achieve one or more of 
their electoral, career, or policymaking goals while not risking unacceptable losses in the pursuit 
of others. However, although this calculation might be straightforward in theory, there is much to 
learn about how it works in practice. 
In Chapter 5, I will assess the payoffs and costs and that flow subsequently from 
committing to legislating. However, before getting to that question, in this chapter I take a closer 
look at how contextual and individual factors are associated with members making the decision 
to commit. To that end, this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I examine the relationship 
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between legislative commitment and MCs’ institutional positions in Congress. Second, I look for 
associations between commitment and contextual factors related to MCs’ districts. Finally, I 
consider how the personal characteristics and pre-congressional experiences of MCs are related 
to whether they act as a policy wonk.14  
Lawmaking and MCs’ Institutional Positions in Congress  
 When a MC arrives for the start of a term, the representative must take stock of his or her 
position in the chamber. In crafting a legislative strategy, a variety of considerations would come 
to mind about the environment in Washington, D.C. Perhaps chief among these is the 
institutional position of the member in the House. Three positions are especially likely to be 
influential as the member decides to what extent he or she should commit to legislating. First, 
members will be either in the majority or minority party. Next, every member will enter the 
session with a degree of seniority in the chamber. Finally, some members will occupy leadership 
positions either in the committee system or in the partisan leadership structure. Each of these 
factors – majority status, seniority, and chamber leadership – is likely to alter the costs and 
benefits associated with adopting an intense, specialized, and consistent agenda. 
Majority Status and Commitment 
In the House, the majority party holds strong procedural advantages over the minority, 
and leadership is strategic about how to wield its control of the legislative and oversight agenda. 
The leadership of the majority party prioritizes legislative matters that support the party’s 
                                                     
14 Except as otherwise noted, data for the variables in this chapter come from the dataset used for 
Bernhard and Sulkin (2018). 
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electoral efforts, and it avoids allowing items on the agenda that divide the party in substantive 
policy debates (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005). The experience of a minority member 
reflects these realities, as members in the minority have poor prospects for getting their 
legislation advanced (Volden and Wiseman 2014). The value of majority control is part of the 
reason for the ferocity of partisan competition in the House (Lee 2016). 
This sharp imbalance of power is likely to impact MCs’ decisions about whether to 
commit to legislating. MCs in the majority should see more opportunities to get legislation 
enacted, thus increasing the potential payoffs of devoting energies to lawmaking and focusing on 
it. A member with a consistent and well-defined agenda can take advantage of being in the 
majority and work to get his or her legislation advanced towards becoming law. MCs in the 
minority would face the opposite situation. A MC in the minority has little opportunity to 
advance legislation, and thus the effort of constructing an intense agenda may provide limited 
prospective benefits. Further, even if MCs in the minority see fit to introduce more legislation, 
the strategically appropriate move might be to increase the diversity of their agendas. This would 
force majority MCs to respond to a wider array of ideas, as well as offer position-taking 
opportunities. In turn, this would drive members away from the specialization that characterizes 
policy wonks. Accordingly, I expect that MCs in the majority will be more committed to 
lawmaking than minority members. 
A first look at descriptive statistics supports this expectation. Figure 4.1 displays the 
average legislative commitment score for members of the majority and minority from the 102nd 
to the 110th Congress, along with 95% confidence intervals. With the exception of the 110th 
Congress, the point estimate for the mean score for MCs in the majority is above that of the 
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minority. While the confidence intervals overlap in most Congresses, a t-test of all the scores 
pooled across Congresses indicates that members in the majority have a higher average level of 
commitment (2.08) than members in the minority (1.90) (t=5.05, p <0.001). 
Figure 4.1: Mean Commitment and Majority Status 
  
  
In addition to comparing the average levels of commitment in the majority and minority, 
it is also useful to consider how many members of the majority and minority are highly 
committed. As I have explained, when a member advances an agenda that is intense, specialized,  
and consistent, he or she comes closest to behaving in accord with the concept of a policy wonk. 
Comparing the proportions of MCs in the majority and minority that have high commitment 
scores leads to similar conclusions as when comparing the means. MCs in the majority are 
slightly more likely to have high commitment scores than MCs in the minority. Across the 102nd 
Note: Figure displays mean commitment scores for member-term observations in 
the majority and minority parties for the 102nd to 110th Congresses. Error bars 
cover the 95% confidence interval for the mean. 
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to 110th Congresses, 20% of the member-term observations in the majority have a legislative 
commitment score above the third quartile for the score (pooled across all Congresses) while 
17% in the minority score at least that high. This difference in proportions is statistically 
significant (chi-squared=5.11, p<0.05), and Figure 4.2 displays the proportion of member-term 
observations with such high commitment scores in the majority and minority from the 102nd to 
the 110th Congresses. In most Congresses, the difference in proportions is not statistically 
significant, but the point estimates for the majority are higher in six of the nine Congresses. 
Figure 4.2: Proportion of Member-Terms with  
High Commitment Scores by Majority Status  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: Figure displays the proportion of member-term observations 
with scores above the third quartile for the commitment score for 
members of the majority and minority parties for the 102nd to the 
110th Congress. Error bars cover the 95% confidence interval for 
the proportion. 
73 
 
Another approach for assessing how majority status relates to legislative commitment is 
to compare members’ levels of commitment when their party switches from majority to minority 
status and vice versa. One opportunity for this is examining Democrats who served in the 103rd 
and the 104th Congresses, the transition that saw Republicans win control under Newt Gingrich. 
In the 103rd Congress, the mean commitment score among Democrats who went on to serve in 
the 104th Congress was 2.16; in the 104th Congress, these same members’ average commitment 
score drops to 1.70, a difference in means that is statistically significant in a paired t-test (t=4.57, 
p<0.001). Along with this shift in average among returning members, there was also a drop in 
the number of Democratic members who were highly invested from the 103rd to the 104th 
Congress. In the 103rd Congress, 58 Democratic members (22% of the caucus) had a 
commitment score above the third quartile of all scores pooled across the 102nd to the 110th 
Congress. In the 104th Congress, that number dropped to only 21 (10%). This difference in 
proportions is statistically significant (chi-square=11.70, p<0.001).  
 The complement of this relationship is whether there is an uptick in commitment in the 
caucus that is newly in the majority. Among Republicans who returned for the 104th Congress, 
their average commitment in the 103rd Congress was 2.07. These same returning members’ 
average commitment drops to 1.83 in the 104th Congress, though the difference is not statistically 
significant (t=0.26, p>0.05). Additionally, there was little change in the number of Republicans 
with high commitment scores in the 103rd and the 104th Congresses. In the 103rd Congress, 37 
Republicans (20% of the caucus) had an investment score above the third quartile of pooled 
observations from the 102nd to the 110th Congresses. This is the same number of highly 
committed Republicans as in the 104th Congress, even though there were more Republicans in 
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the 104th Congress and the party was in the majority (the difference in proportions, 20% and 
16%, is not significant (chi-squared=0.29, p>0.05).  
 A second opportunity to observe how patterns of legislative commitment change after a 
switch in control of the chamber comes after the 2006 elections, when the Democrats took 
control of the chamber in the 110th Congress. Looking first at the Democrats, there is a downtick 
in the mean commitment scores among the Democrats in the 110th Congress who returned from 
the 109th, shifting from 2.15 to 1.79 (with a paired t-test, t=3.36, p<0.001). There is also a 
decrease in the proportion of highly committed in the Democratic caucus. While there were 56 
Democrats with commitment scores above the third quartile in the 109th Congress (28% of the 
caucus), there are just 32 in the 110th Congress (13%), a difference in proportions that is 
statistically significant (chi square=27.6, p<0.001). To complete the comparison, the average 
commitment among Republicans who returned to Congress in the 110th Congress was 1.91, 
lower than the 2.26 average among those members’ in the 109th Congress (in a paired t-test, 
t=3.72, p<0.001). There was also a significant drop in the number of Republicans who scored 
above the third quartile from 27% (63 members) in the 109th Congress to 17% (35 members) in 
the 110th (chi square=5.44, p<0.05). 
 In total, this review of the relationship between legislative commitment and majority 
status supports the hypothesis that being in the majority leads to members behaving like policy 
wonks. However, this factor is not determinative. There are also many minority MCs that 
continue to behave as policy wonks, and the switches in majority control in 1994 and 2006 had 
disruptive effects on legislative commitment. Members that were newly in the majority were not, 
on average, more likely to commit to legislating than in their prior terms in the minority. This 
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suggests that while being in the majority supports legislative commitment, members are slow to 
adjust to this new institutional position. 
Seniority and Commitment 
Along with majority status, a second feature of MCs’ institutional context that shapes 
their experiences in Congress is seniority. Seniority provides members with a variety of 
privileges and advantages. Senior members have had more time to develop policy interests, build 
expertise working in government, and recruit allies within the chamber (Hall 1996; Ritchie 2018; 
Schiller 1995). Accordingly, senior members have a greater likelihood of getting their legislation 
to advance in the chamber (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Volden 
and Wiseman 2014).  
The net effect of this should be that senior members are more likely to commit to 
legislating than junior members. Senior MCs should find it easier to pick issues to emphasize, 
will have amassed more information about those topics, will have experience crafting legislation, 
and are more likely to see their bills advance in the chamber. This combination of factors is 
likely to decrease the costs associated with committing to lawmaking and increase the potential 
benefits. I expect, then, that seniority is associated with higher levels of legislative commitment. 
 Initial results support this expectation. I measure seniority by the number of years that a 
MC has served in Congress. In Figure 4.3, I divide member-term observations into four groups 
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based on the quartile into which the MC’s seniority falls.15 In the left panel, I display the average 
legislative commitment score of members in each quartile of seniority. On the right, I display the 
proportion of observations in which the MC had a high commitment score (again, above the third 
quartile). As the figures indicate, higher seniority is associated with greater legislative 
commitment, both when looking at mean levels and proportion of MCs with high scores. The 
differences among members flatten out at higher levels of seniority, but the contrast between 
very junior members and those with longer tenure is apparent. 
Figure 4.3: Commitment and Seniority 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 In the first quartile are MCs who have served two years or less; the second quartile between 3 
and 7 years; the third quartile between eight and 13 years, and the fourth quartile 14 or more 
years. 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of member-term 
observations with scores above the third quartile, grouped by seniority quartile, 
from the 102nd to 110th Congress. Error bars cover the 95% confidence interval for 
the mean and proportion. 
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Leadership Positions 
The final institutional positions of interest that I examine are leadership positions in the 
chamber. Several leadership roles could be associated with greater commitment to lawmaking, 
including committee chairmanships and ranking member positions, subcommittee chairs, and 
party leadership positions (such as majority and minority leaders and whips). As with majority 
status and greater seniority, both committee and party leadership positions provide MCs with 
substantially improved prospects for seeing their legislation passed into law (Anderson et al. 
2003; Volden and Wiseman 2014). Committee and party leaders also have significant resource 
advantages over rank-and-file members, with larger staffs and greater ability to induce rank-and-
file members to support them (Curry 2015).  
With these advantages, I expect that holding a leadership position should have a similar 
impact on MCs’ commitment to lawmaking as do majority status and seniority. Being a leader 
decreases costs and increases potential benefits of legislating, so holding such positions should 
make a MC more likely to commit to it. However, this expectation is not equally strong across 
leadership positions. Committee chairs from the majority party are traditionally legislative 
leaders in Congress, and they have especially strong procedural prerogatives that increase the 
likelihood of them getting their own bills to receive attention in the committee (Curry 2015; 
Oleszek 2007). Accordingly, holding a committee chair should be most closely associated with 
behaving as a policy wonk. For the other leadership positions – ranking members, subcommittee 
chairs, and party leadership – the expectation is more uncertain. Ranking members, as members 
of the minority party, have less power than the chair. Subcommittee chairs, even as members of 
the majority, are similarly weaker than committee chairs, in part because their staffing is 
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dependent on the decisions of the committee chair (Curry 2015). Outside the committee 
structure, party leaders also have additional staff resources and greater power in the chamber. 
However, these MCs are selected for intra-caucus coalition building more than policymaking, 
making it unclear whether the resource advantage would translate into greater legislative 
commitment. 
 Figure 4.4: Commitment and Congressional Leadership 
 
 
 
Comparisons of levels of commitment among MCs with different leadership positions in 
the House generally support these expectations. The left panel of Figure 4.4 displays the average 
level of legislative commitment among committee chairs, ranking members in the minority, 
subcommittee chairs, party leaders in the majority and minority, and finally among rank and file 
members who hold no leadership positions. The right panel shows the proportion of MCs in 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of member-term 
observations with commitment scores above the third quartile for members in 
different leadership positions for the 102nd to the 110th Congress. Error bars cover 
the 95% confidence interval for the mean and proportion. 
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those same leadership positions with a commitment score above the third quartile. The evidence 
in the figures reflects how differences in power that come with leadership relate to whether MCs 
commit to legislating. Looking first at the left panel, committee chairs do have the highest 
average scores of legislative commitment, and the proportion of high scoring members is greatest 
within this group. Beyond this contrast, the differences between groups are less distinct, but 
ranking members, subcommittee chairs, and majority party leaders are all more committed to 
legislating than members of the rank and file. 
Individual Political Context and Investment 
 As the last section indicated, initial findings show that the institutional positions of MCs 
in Congress are related to whether they commit to lawmaking. However, the context in 
Washington is not the only factor that goes into MCs’ cost-benefit analyses. MCs also come to 
Congress mindful of the conditions they face back home. MCs know that they must win 
reelection, and their choice of legislative strategy is likely shaped by the characteristics of their 
constituencies. I examine the relationship between lawmaking commitment and three 
characteristics of MC’s individual political contexts: electoral security, constituency 
demographics, and the size of a MC’s congressional delegation. 
Electoral Security 
Electoral considerations are never far from MCs’ minds when they make choices about 
their activities. Members who perceive that they are electorally secure may feel that they have 
flexibility to pursue a broad range of activities, while MCs who are under the electoral gun may 
feel compelled to shift towards behaviors that will shore up their standing with constituents. 
There are a variety of ways that vulnerable MCs might do this, such as by increasing the amount 
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of time they spend on constituency service, trying to provide more distributive benefits to the 
district, and by recalibrating their legislative work to align more closely with the interests of the 
district or respond to the content of the previous campaign (Fenno 1978; Lazarus 2009; Sulkin 
2005). 
There are conflicting expectations about how legislative commitment would figure into 
this. One possibility is that MCs who are electorally secure will be the most likely to adopt 
intense, specialized, and consistent agendas. Insulated from electoral threat, secure members 
might feel that they have more time to spend working on legislation and intensify their 
legislative efforts. They may sense that they have flexibility to focus on a smaller set of issues 
that fit their policy interests rather than attempt to diversify their legislative portfolios, leading to 
greater specialization. Finally, they might believe that they have found the right mix of issues 
that fit their district and press on with their established legislative agendas. On the other hand, 
though, a counter hypothesis is also plausible. MCs who are secure might feel that they can shirk 
lawmaking work and focus on other activities that are a better fit for their goals. Alternatively, 
MCs that are insecure may think they can improve their position by doubling down on 
lawmaking, demonstrating to their constituents that they are working hard to represent their 
interests. A priori, it is difficult to predict the net effect of these conflicting mechanisms.   
A first cut at assessing the relationship between electoral security and legislative 
commitment does not point to a strong relationship either way. I measure electoral security by 
using MCs’ vote share in the previous election (the election in November before the 
congressional term begins in January). Commitment scores and vote share in the previous 
election are uncorrelated with each other (r = -0.01). In the left panel of Figure 4.5, I display the 
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average commitment scores of MCs whose previous vote share falls into four tranches of 
electoral security, from the members that received less than 55% of the previous vote to MCs 
that received more than 75% of the vote.16 The right panel displays the proportions of member-
term observations in each group with commitment scores above the third quartile. As the figures 
indicate, there is no obvious pattern here. MCs that are quite insecure (winning less than 55% of 
the vote) are the least likely to be highly committed to legislating, but the mean levels of 
commitment do not vary much across the four levels of electoral security. It is intriguing that 
MCs who are secure but not extremely so, winning 65-75% of the vote, are the most likely to 
have a commitment score above the third quartile, as it suggests that there is an electoral “sweet 
spot” for MCs behaving as policy wonks. However, given that the overall relationship between 
electoral vulnerability and commitment is diffuse, the spike in highly committed members at that 
level of security should be interpreted cautiously.17 
                                                     
16 The mean vote share of a MC is 70% and the median is 67%. 
17 Another possibility is that members do not adjust their levels of investment as a function of 
their absolute level of electoral security, but instead might only respond to a relative change in 
their security. A member who has performed much worse or much better in the last election may 
feel they either need to or are able to recalibrate his or her legislative strategy. However, there is 
little evidence to support this claim. Among members who performed at least five percentage 
points worse in their last election than the previous election, a paired t-test shows that these 
threatened members on average made a small increase their level of investment as compared to 
their previous term, but the differences are not statistically significant.  
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Figure 4.5: Commitment and Electoral Security 
   
  
 
 
Constituency Demographics 
In addition to electoral vulnerability, there is another way that the electoral connection 
might influence MCs in their decisions about how much to commit to legislating. Rather than 
being driven by electoral pressure, whether a MC behaves as a policy wonk could be related to 
the characteristics of a MC’s constituency. Put simply, citizens and constituencies vary in what 
kinds of behaviors they want from their representatives, including their desire for policy-based 
representation. (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Eulau and Karps 1977; Harden 2016). Based on a 
reading of their constituents’ demands, MCs may choose to prioritize service, allocative, 
descriptive, substantive, or other “flavors” of representation to suit the expectations of their 
constituents. If citizens do not perceive that their constituents are asking for an active, 
specialized, and consistent pattern of legislating, then MCs may well adopt other strategies. 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and 
proportion of member-term observations with commitment 
scores above the third quartile for members at different 
levels of electoral security for the 102nd to the 110th 
Congress. Error bars cover the 95% confidence interval for 
the mean and proportion. 
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Care should be taken when generalizing about the demands of different identity-based or 
socio-economic groups. However, scholars have found some important patterns in what citizens 
seem to want from their legislators. The evidence suggests that low income and minority 
constituents have less of a demand for policy representation than affluent and white citizens 
(Griffin and Flavin 2007; Griffin and Flavin 2011; Harden 2016). There are complementary 
explanations for this tendency. Historically or economically marginalized groups may be more 
focused on how MCs provide descriptive representation. Additionally, marginalized citizens may 
place greater value on direct assistance from MCs, in the form of constituency service or 
bringing federal dollars back to the district. Regardless of whether these motivations are 
correctly ascribed to constituents, representatives respond as such. Studies show consistently that 
the policy preferences of majority and more affluent citizens get more attention from lawmakers 
(Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Griffin and Newman 2008). 
Based these findings, I expect that MCs who represent lower income districts and those 
with larger minority populations would be less likely to behave as masters of the public business. 
If minority constituents do not value policy representation as much as white constituents, then 
MCs are likely to shift their strategies accordingly. Likewise, the bias towards MCs representing 
the policy preferences of affluent constituencies is likely to translate to a higher level of 
legislative commitment among MCs whose districts are wealthier than MCs from poorer 
districts.  
To provide a preliminary test of these expectations, I measure district economic affluence 
by using the percentage of constituents with an income below the poverty line, and I measure the 
racial and ethnic composition of a congressional district by using the percentage of constituents 
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that are white. In Figure 4.6, in the upper left panel, I display the mean commitment scores for 
MCs from districts with different levels of economic affluence divided into quartiles based on 
the percentage of the constituents that are below the poverty line. The upper right panel of Figure 
4.6 displays the proportion of MCs that have a legislative commitment score above the third 
quartile, again grouped by poverty quartile. The lower left and lower right panels display the 
mean commitment scores and proportions of MCs with high commitment scores for districts that 
fall into each quartile of the percentage of constituents that are white. 
Figure 4.6: Commitment and Constituency Demographics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of MCs with 
commitment scores above the third quartile for MCs representing districts at 
different levels of economic affluence and white percentage, for the 102nd to the 
110th Congress. Error bars cover the 95% confidence interval for the mean and 
proportion. 
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 These figures show that there is a relationship between district demographics and the 
tendency for an MC to commit to legislating, though the pattern is clearer when looking at 
economic affluence than at the racial makeup of a district. The top two figures, comparing levels 
of commitment of MCs representing districts in increasingly poorer districts, point to a pattern of 
MCs from less affluent districts being less likely to be policy wonks. The mean level of 
commitment decreases across the four quartiles of poverty rate in the district. The same pattern 
occurs with the proportion of MCs that have a high legislative commitment score, as there is a 
progressively smaller proportion of observations with a high commitment score across the 
quartiles for poverty rate in the district. There are more mixed results in the bottom two figures, 
showing the comparison of commitment levels among MCs from increasingly whiter districts. 
MCs representing the districts with the lowest proportion of white constituents (i.e., districts with 
the largest minority populations), have the lowest mean level of commitment. Mean commitment 
increases up to the third quartile of proportion white, but then dips again at the high end. 
Additionally, there is no clear pattern between the proportion of a district’s citizens that are white 
and the proportions of representatives from those districts with high legislative commitment 
scores. 
Congressional Delegation Size 
Along with electoral security and district demographics, the final feature of MCs’ 
individual political context that I examine is delegation size. Previous studies of non-roll call 
legislative behavior have shown that the size of a congressional delegation can have a variety of 
effects on how MCs act. Larger delegations provide opportunities for coalition building because 
of the alignment of interests within a state (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; 
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Bickers and Stein 2000; Koger 2003). With this support, MCs from larger delegations might 
believe that their legislation is more likely to advance with the help of their delegation. Further, 
this network could be a mechanism for information sharing information among a delegation, thus 
lowering the costs of generating legislation. Further, having many MCs from a state might also 
feasibly open “policy lanes” for MCs, with MCs across the state picking different substantive 
areas of emphasis. In total, these factors lead to the expectation that larger delegation sizes will 
be associated with higher levels of legislative commitment. 
Figure 4.7: Commitment and Delegation Size 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 provides only limited evidence for this expectation. The left panel of the figure 
displays the average commitment score of members from increasingly large delegations, grouped 
by quartile. The right panel displays the proportion of member-term observations with high 
commitment scores across the quartiles for delegation size. It is difficult to discern a pattern in 
these figures. While MCs from the largest delegations have the highest average levels of 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of member-term 
observations with commitment scores above the third quartile for members with 
different delegation sizes for the 102nd to the 110th Congress. Error bars cover the 
95% confidence interval for the mean and proportion. 
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commitment among MCs, the confidence interval for the mean overlaps with that from members 
from the smallest delegations. Additionally, the confidence intervals for the estimates of the 
proportion of highly committed MCs overlap across all the delegation size groups. 
Personal Characteristics and Backgrounds of MCs 
 The analyses so far present mixed evidence about how contextual factors shape MCs’ 
commitment decisions. Members are more likely to commit to legislating when they are in an 
institutionally privileged position. There is also a tendency for MCs to commit to legislating 
when they represent more affluent citizens. However, MCs are not entirely creatures of the 
context in which they operate. While it is less common, some members behave as policy wonks 
even when it might not be expected, as when they are in the minority or are electorally 
vulnerable. 
 The fact that members commit to legislating even when they are not in ideal institutional 
or contextual settings underscores that the individual experiences of MCs figure into their 
decisions about their behavior. While it may be easy to forget, members of Congress are people 
too, and they vary in their interests and skillsets just as do people in other professions. Thus, 
while context matters as MCs weigh the costs and benefits of acting like a policy wonk, there 
should also be associations between this choice and MCs’ individual-level characteristics. In this 
section, I set out expectations and provide an initial look at three such possible factors: (1) 
previous political, professional, and educational experiences, (2) social identity, and (3) 
ideological extremity. 
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Prior Educational, Political, and Professional Experience 
Like anyone starting a new job, MCs arrive at the Capitol with a set of prior educational 
and professional experiences. Some have specialized educations, have worked in politics before, 
or have traditional pre-political careers such as in law or business. Other MCs have less typical 
backgrounds or are political neophytes. This variation has the potential to affect how MCs 
perform once they are in office, modifying the costs and benefits associated with their behaviors, 
including their legislative work. 
Former state legislators, for example, start their service in Congress having already 
worked in a similar institutional context. These members know what it means to legislate, 
understand something about how to work in coalitions, may already have a well-defined set of 
policy interests, and, finally, may have experience in non-legislative tasks like fundraising. 
Research has shown that this prior experience helps these members perform better in the 
institution, obtaining committee leadership positions more readily and getting more legislation 
farther towards becoming law (Berkman 1993; Francis and Bramlett 2017; Volden and Wiseman 
2014). A similar logic suggests that other forms of prior political experience, such as in the 
executive branch or working for a political party, would also yield benefits for MCs (Francis 
2014).  
Along with prior political experience, different non-political professional and educational 
experiences might also impact the skills that MCs bring to the chamber. Educational experiences 
prepare MCs to deal with complex information and balance multiple priorities, skills that are 
potentially valuable for members that want to engage with lawmaking in Congress. Knowledge 
and capabilities cultivated in a pre-congressional career can also be useful. There are many 
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potential relationships between pre-congressional careers and legislative behavior, but I focus on 
just one: whether having a “traditional” pre-congressional career experience in law or business 
makes it more likely to that an MC will commit to legislating. Candidates often trumpet their 
business acumen in their campaign appeals, arguing that it positions them to run government like 
an all-American mom-and-pop shop or a Fortune 500 company, depending on their own 
background (Francis 2014). Lawyers can also make a credible claim that they are ready to 
legislate, having already been acquainted with how to interpret statutes and understanding legal 
and bureaucratic processes (Francis 2014; Eulau and Sprague 1964). Whether this is campaign 
puffery or not, the transferability of skills acquired in these traditional pre-congressional careers 
to legislating is quite important, as about three quarters of MCs have worked in at least one of 
these fields prior to coming to Congress. 
As with institutional positions and individual contextual factors, I begin investigating 
how pre-congressional experiences are related to legislative commitment by looking at average 
levels of legislative commitment and the rate at which MCs have high commitment scores. To 
capture educational differences, I divide member-term observations into three groups based on 
whether the MC has no college degree, a college degree, or a graduate degree. Next, I divide 
member-term observations into groups based on whether the member is a former state legislator, 
has political experience other than service as a state legislator, or has no political experience.  
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Figure 4.8: Commitment and Prior Political, Educational, and Professional Experiences 
 
 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of 
member-term observations with commitment scores above the 
third quartile for members with different prior legislative 
experience, educational, and professional experiences for the 
102nd to the 110th Congress. Error bars cover the 95% confidence 
interval for the mean and proportion. 
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Finally, I split member-term observations into two groups based on whether the MC had pre-
congressional experience working in either law or business.18 
In Figure 4.8, I present the mean commitment scores for MCs with different prior 
political experiences, educational backgrounds, and career experiences. The differences in 
legislative commitment across members with these different personal backgrounds are slight. 
There is no difference in mean commitment or the proportion of member-terms with high 
commitment scores when comparing MCs with different levels of education or varieties of prior 
political experience, with all of the confidence intervals overlapping across groups. Turning to 
the bottom panel of the figure, there is also no difference in mean commitment for MCs with or 
without pre-congressional careers in law or business. The only indication of a relationship 
between pre-congressional experiences and legislative commitment comes from the comparison 
of the proportion of member-terms with high commitment scores between members with and 
without traditional pre-congressional careers in law or business. There is a slight difference in 
                                                     
18 For information about MCs’ pre-congressional careers, I used data collected by Francis 
(Francis 2014; Francis and Bramlett 2017) and incorporated into the dataset compiled by Sulkin 
(Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). To fill in missing data, I collected additional information with the 
help of two research assistants. I used the coding system outlined in Francis and Bramlett (2017). 
In this scheme, MCs are coded to have legal experience if they worked as a judge or as a lawyer 
in either government, nonprofit, or private practice. Business experience includes work 
experience in fields such as accounting, insurance, real estate, engineering, banking, insurance, 
and the like (Francis and Bramlett 2017). 
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proportions between MCs with and without a traditional career path, though it small in 
magnitude.19 
Social Identity 
Aside from prior life experience, an individual-level factor that relates to how MCs 
behave in Congress is their personal social identities. As it does in other behavioral domains 
outside of Congress, gender and race affect the life experiences of MCs, and this extends to how 
they approach their jobs as representatives. First, with respect to gender, studies have shown that 
men and women legislate differently (for an overview, see Lawless 2015). Several of these 
findings stand out when thinking about whether women are likely to be policy wonks. Women 
and men behave similarly at the roll call stage, but the set of issues that they legislate over is 
different (Lawless 2015). Women are more likely to devote attention to women’s issues, like 
women’s health, child care, and gender equity (Burrel 1996; Swers 2002; Gerrity et al. 2007). 
Women sponsor more legislation than men (Anzia and Berry 2011), and they are more effective 
at getting legislation to advance towards becoming law (Volden and Wiseman 2014; Volden, 
Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013). It is possible that women’s higher degree of legislative 
effectiveness is partially attributable to their approach to legislating, which may be more 
                                                     
19 One possibility is that contrasts between MCs on the basis of pre-congressional experiences 
would be sharpest when members are early in their careers. To account for this possibility, I also 
compared levels of commitment on the basis of pre-congressional professional and career 
experiences among only those MC-term observations in which the MC had served less than four 
years in Congress. The differences are no sharper there, with no differences across groups. 
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collaborative and less individualistic (see Thomas 1994). Yet while they may be more effective, 
women do face obstacles building credibility on some issues, especially stereotypically gendered 
issues like those related to national security (Swers 2007). 
Along with gender, MCs’ racial and ethnic identities are also associated with differences 
in legislative strategy vis-à-vis white MCs. In the same way that women are more likely to 
represent women’s issues, research also shows that politicians are likely to represent the interests 
of constituents that share their own background (Broockman 2013; Burden 2007; Harden 2016; 
Tate 2003). This connection extends beyond roll call votes. For example, black and Latino/a 
legislators tend to propose bills that reflect the policy interests of constituents that share their 
race or ethnicity (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Griffin 2014; Rouse 2013). Yet while minority 
lawmakers may emphasize minority interests in their legislative work, they do not appear to 
enjoy the higher levels of legislative success that women do (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Volden 
and Wiseman 2014). 
Given this review, there are mixed expectations about whether minority and female MCs 
will be more likely or less likely to be identified as policy wonks than white and male MCs. On 
one hand, minority and female representatives face cross-pressures that white and male 
representatives do not. MCs from traditionally marginalized groups could feel pressure to 
address a wider range of issues than other MCs, which would reduce their ability to specialize 
around a smaller range of topics. In the case of women, the possibility of greater legislative 
effectiveness might suggest that committing to policymaking would lead to benefits, but this 
expectation would not hold among minority MCs. 
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Figure 4.9: Commitment and MC Identity 
  
 
 
Yet while there are conflicting expectations about how social identity relates with 
legislative commitment, the descriptive results are less equivocal. Figure 4.9 displays the average 
legislative commitment scores and proportion of terms with high commitment scores for white, 
nonwhite, male, and female MCs. As the left panel indicates, white MCs have a higher average 
legislative commitment score than their non-white colleagues. Additionally, a higher proportion 
of white MCs have higher legislative commitment scores than women.  
Ideology 
Along with their previous life experiences and social identity, a final individual 
characteristic of MCs that I explore that could drive levels of commitment to lawmaking is MCs’ 
ideological extremity. Of course, MCs vary in their ideological stances, ranging from very 
conservative to very liberal. A plausible case could be made that more extreme ideologies would 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of member-term 
with commitment scores above the third quartile for members with different racial 
and gender identities for the 102nd to the 110th Congress. Error bars cover the 
95% confidence interval for the mean and proportion. 
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be associated with higher legislative commitment. Some scholars have advanced a liberalism 
hypothesis, suggesting that more liberal MCs are more likely to introduce more legislation 
(Woon 2009; Schiller 1995). Additionally, an intense ideological viewpoint could drive an MC 
to push hard on substantive issues that are important to them, giving them unwavering attention 
across time. The intrinsic benefit associated with “fighting for the cause” could thus drive 
legislative specialization and consistency. This, in turn, would lead to greater legislative 
commitment. Yet there is a potential downside to being an ideological firebrand that could 
discourage such MCs from being policy wonks. To the extent that ideologues are outliers in 
Congress, they may have fewer willing coalition partners, or their ideas may be so far outside the 
norm that they are unlikely to be selected by leadership for consideration in the legislative 
process (see Volden and Wiseman 2014).  
Figure 4.10: Commitment and MC Ideology 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures display mean commitment scores and proportion of member-term 
observations with scores above the third quartile, group by quartile of ideological 
extremity, for the 102nd to the 110th Congress. Error bars cover the 95% 
confidence interval for the mean and proportion. 
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I assess ideological extremity by measuring the absolute value of the difference between 
a MC’s DW-NOMINATE score in a term and the median score for the Congress in that term 
(Volden and Wiseman 2014). There is no obvious relationship between ideological extremity 
and legislative commitment. Figure 4.10 shows the mean levels of legislative commitment and 
the proportion of MC-term observations with high commitment scores, dividing the observations 
by quartile of ideological extremity. There are no indications of an association. 
Culmination of Results and Conclusion 
In the previous sections, I described the relationship between legislative commitment and 
a series of variables capturing elements of MCs’ individual characteristics and aspects of the 
political contexts in which they operate. At each stage, I provided bivariate comparisons that, in 
some cases, were suggestive of associations with legislative commitment. These descriptive 
findings are important for the picture they paint of legislative representation in the United States. 
While some of these associations might be spurious in an inferential sense, they are very real to 
observers who do not consider every possible variable when assessing the political landscape. If 
policy wonks are mostly male, white, in the majority party, or typically share other 
characteristics, this is the profile that citizens and other political figures see. Because policy  
wonks are a critical part of American constitutional design, their profile matters for how citizens 
perceive legislators. 
This observation aside, the case for systematic associations between MCs’ legislative 
commitment and these variables is strengthened by conducting a multivariate analysis. Thus, as a 
final step, I estimate regression models that include covariates for the institutional positions, 
contextual factors, and personal characteristics that I have reviewed in this chapter. I estimate  
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Table 4.1: Legislative Commitment and Individual Factors, 102nd to 110th Congresses 
  DV=Leg. Commit 
 
 
Model 1 
DV=High Commitment Score 
0/1 
 
Model 2 
Institutional Position    
Majority 0.24 **    (0.08) 0.39 *  (0.17) 
Seniority 0.02 *     (0.01) 0.03 *  (0.02) 
Comm. Chair or Ranking 
Mem. 
0.33 ***   (0.09) 0.35 *  (0.17) 
Party Leader -0.06       (0.07) -0.03    (0.16) 
Subcommittee Chair 0.20 **    (0.06) 0.38 ** (0.13) 
     
District Context     
Previous Vote Share 0.00   (0.00) 0.00    (0.00) 
White Percentage in District 0.04       (0.18) 0.21    (0.42) 
Poverty Percentage in 
District 
-1.46 *     (0.58) -2.89 *  (1.35) 
Delegation Size 0.01 **    (0.00) 0.01 *  (0.00) 
     
Personal Characteristics    
Former State Legislator -0.04       (0.05) -0.05    (0.12) 
Prior Political Experience 0.01       (0.10) -0.06    (0.21) 
Graduate Degree -0.02       (0.06) -0.07    (0.13) 
College Degree 0.07       (0.10) -0.02    (0.22) 
Business or Law -0.10 #     (0.06) -0.30 *  (0.13) 
Woman -0.08       (0.08) -0.40 *  (0.20) 
Nonwhite -0.17 #     (0.10) -0.21    (0.24) 
Ideology Dist. 0.50 **    (0.16) 0.91 ** (0.34) 
     
Constant 1.59 ***   (0.28) -1.69 ** (0.64) 
N 3263               3263            
R2/Pseudo R2 0.07            0.06            
 
Note: Cell entries are OLS and logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, 
clustering on the individual MC. The dependent variables are the legislative commitment score 
and a dichotomous indicator for legislative commitment scores above the third quartile. *** p 
< 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; # p <   0.1.   
 
 
 
 
98 
 
two models: first, an OLS regression model with legislative commitment as the dependent 
variable, and. second, a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous indicator variable for whether the member has a high legislative commitment score 
in a term. A member-term observation receives a score a one on this variable if the legislative 
commitment score for the member in that term is above the third quartile for the score, pooled 
across all Congresses. The results for these two models are displayed in Table 1. 
The results replicate many of the conclusions drawn from the previous sections. As the 
pattern of coefficients and their statistical significance indicate, a MC’s institutional position in 
Congress is associated with greater legislative commitment. MCs appear to have higher 
legislative commitment scores when they are in the majority, have been in the chamber for 
longer, and hold committee leadership positions as either a chair, ranking member, or 
subcommittee chair. With respect to district contextual factors, there is no evidence of a 
relationship between electoral security and commitment, but there is some evidence that district 
demographics matter. The regression results show that district affluence is related to 
commitment, as an increasing poverty rate in a district is associated with a lower legislative 
commitment score. In the multivariate analysis, there is also evidence that MCs from larger 
delegations tend to have higher legislative commitment scores. Finally, the model coefficients 
for variables capturing MCs’ individual characteristics also echo the bivariate comparisons, with 
several coefficients reaching or approaching the p<0.05 level of statistical significance. The 
results indicate that women are less likely to have a high commitment score during a term than 
men, that nonwhite legislators tend to have lower average commitment scores, and that careers in 
business and law are associated with lower levels of legislative commitment. Additionally, the 
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positive and statistically significant coefficient in the regression results suggests that greater 
ideological extremity is associated with greater legislative commitment, a result that was not 
indicated with the bivariate comparison. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I started from the assumption that MCs make decisions about how much 
they commit to legislating based on the results of an informal cost-benefit analysis. From there, I 
considered how MCs’ institutional positions, features of their individual political contexts, and 
their personal characteristics would be associated with legislative commitment. To be sure, these 
results are in accord with the idea that MCs’ act as utility maximizers who commit to legislating 
strategically. MCs are more likely to commit to legislating when they are in preferred 
institutional positions that bring resource advantages and present a greater likelihood that their 
legislation will progress towards becoming law. Similarly, MCs that represent less affluent 
districts are less likely to commit to legislating, arguably because their constituents have weaker 
demands for policy-based representation than do wealthier citizens. I also find evidence in the 
multivariate analysis that larger delegation size is associated with greater legislative 
commitment, which would conform with the previous findings that larger delegations offer the 
advantage of having more natural coalition partners.  
Other findings in this chapter, however, will require future work to interpret definitively. 
In some cases, it was difficult to predict how individual and contextual factors would figure into 
MCs’ behavioral calculations. For example, there is evidence in these results that women are less 
likely than to be highly committed than men, that MCs with traditional pre-congressional careers 
are less likely to be highly committed than MCs without such backgrounds, and that MCs who 
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are more ideologically extreme tend to be more committed. I also did not find evidence that 
electoral vulnerability was associated with legislative commitment. All of these findings are 
consistent with a cost-benefit framework, but the expectations prior to completing the analysis 
were less clear. As such, future work could look at these relationships more closely, aiming to 
get a stronger sense of the tradeoffs associated with legislative commitment. 
The other major unanswered question that stands out from this chapter is whether 
legislative commitment leads to subsequent costs or benefits. In this chapter, I have assumed that 
members make a calculation about the opportunities and risks that flow from legislative 
commitment, but I did not explore the consequences that MCs see when their colleagues adopt 
the behaviors of policy wonks. This is the topic I address in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Risks and Rewards of Legislative Commitment 
 
 In Chapter 4, I showed that legislative commitment varies across MCs as a function of 
the institutional position of MCs, contextual features related to MCs’ districts, and the personal 
characteristics of representatives. This supports the claim that I presented in Chapter 2 about the 
cost-benefit calculations that lead MCs to commit to lawmaking. The results underscored that 
MCs make decisions about how to commit to legislating by weighing the likelihood that they 
will receive intrinsic or extrinsic benefits from investment against the tradeoffs associated with 
expending time and resources. As such, with institutional positions, individual political contexts, 
and personal characteristics all leading to variation in these calculations, legislative commitment 
in Congress tends to be higher among members in certain positions and with certain 
characteristics. 
 In this chapter, I shift away from the characteristics of MCs that influence their 
investment decisions at the beginning of and during the term, and I instead focus on another part 
of the utility maximizing process that I have posited: whether members see acting like a policy 
wonk as associated with subsequent benefits or costs. My theoretical framework indicates that 
members will be more likely to operate as masters of the public business when they believe that 
it will help them to achieve their goals - specifically, electoral security, intra-Congressional 
advancement, advancement beyond the House, and policy achievement. Conversely, members 
would shy away from committing to lawmaking if they observe that high levels of commitment 
undermine their pursuit of these objectives. However, I have yet to provide any evidence of 
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whether this mechanism operates in practice. Thus, in the sections that follow, I examine the 
associations between legislative commitment and electoral, career, and policymaking outcomes. 
Electoral Consequences of Commitment 
One potential reason why MCs would commit to a legislative agenda would be that it 
redounds to their electoral benefit. In a classic model of democratic accountability, citizens 
would use the legislative record of their representative as a factor in their decisions about 
whether to support him or her in the upcoming election. Voters would perceive a commitment to 
legislating as a positive factor in their evaluations, at least if the MC’s proposals aligned with the 
citizens’ preferences. Of course, the truth is likely more complicated. Whether citizens have the 
ability to evaluate MCs’ performance in such a way is contestable, given what political 
psychology research has shown about the impact of motivated reasoning, affective partisanship, 
and information processing shortcomings (see, for an overview, Kuklinski and Peyton 2007). Yet 
even so, citizens appear to reward or punish politicians based on how much their behavior 
conforms to their own preferences, and they also respond to reputations for competence and 
honesty (Basinger 2012; Hall 2015; Bishin, Stevens and Wilson 2006; Hall 2018; Hirano and 
Snyder 2014; McCurley and Mondak 1995). This accords with the behaviors of MCs, who make 
obvious efforts to communicate their achievements and substantive priorities to constituents 
(Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). Such findings would suggest that increased 
legislative commitment would be associated with improved electoral performance in subsequent 
elections. 
Yet while a positive association between commitment and electoral performance is 
possible, there are reasons to question this expectation. First, it is possible that some of the 
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potential benefits of legislative commitment would be counteracted by lost opportunities for the 
MC to engage in electorally beneficial activities. If a member is focused on legislating, he or she 
may be taking time away from the district or may have missed opportunities for position-taking 
that would come from having a less specialized agenda. If this is correct, it might weaken or 
entirely counteract whatever credit constituents give MCs for their hard work. 
A second factor that would weaken a positive relationship – or for that matter, a negative 
one – between commitment and electoral benefits could be the strategic behavior of MCs. It 
might be that only members who consider themselves to be electorally secure already would act 
as a policy wonk. In Chapter 4, my results did not show evidence of such a pattern in the 
aggregate, and legislative commitment was not associated with previous electoral performance. 
However, to the extent that this kind of strategic calculation operates in individual cases, it 
would suppress a relationship between legislative commitment in a term and electoral 
performance following it. Additionally, MCs could use legislative commitment to appease key 
constituencies that are electorally critical to the member, even if it does not result in a net 
increase in electoral performance. Finally, MCs might simply understand that their constituents 
are unlikely to modify their vote choice on the basis of their legislative activity. If this is true, 
then MCs would have flexibility to select whichever level of commitment is appropriate in light 
of their other objectives, and there would be no positive or negative association with electoral 
performance.  
Acknowledging these conflicting expectations, I begin my examination of the 
relationship between legislative commitment and electoral considerations by focusing on a 
straightforward indicator of an MC’s electoral strength: his or her share of the votes in the next 
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election. As background here, it is important to note that most members of Congress benefit from 
a strong incumbency advantage, and the average vote share for incumbents is about 70%. Out of 
the more than 4,000 observations in my dataset, only 115 MCs received less than 50% of the 
vote in the election following the member-term observation.  
Even so, there is evidence of a slight negative relationship between commitment and 
electoral performance. To test for this, I modeled the change in members’ vote share from the 
previous election as a function of legislative commitment during the term, using OLS regression 
with robust standard errors clustered on member. I used four different variables to capture 
commitment: the member’s legislative commitment score in the term prior to the election, an 
indicator for whether the member was a “wonk” in the previous term (scoring about the third 
quartile of the commitment score), the average commitment score of the member for all terms 
prior to the election (a running average), and a dichotomous indicator for whether the member 
had an average prior commitment score above the third quartile (which I call “running average 
wonk”). Along with the commitment variable in each model, I include control variables that are 
standard in analyses of electoral performance in Congress, including whether the member holds 
any leadership position in Congress (committee, party, or chamber), majority status, seniority, 
the MC’s previous vote share, and the national vote share of the MC’s party in the previous 
election. In addition, I include in the model an indicator variable that equals one if the MC is a 
good ideological match with his or her constituents and a zero if not.20 
                                                     
20 The “fit” variable was constructed by Bernhard and Sulkin (2018, 134) and is based on the 
match between MCs’ NOMINATE scores and Kernell’s (2009) ideology scores for districts.  
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The estimates for these models are displayed in Table 5.1. The results demonstrate that 
commitment has a weak negative relationship with subsequent electoral performance. Because 
the outcome variable in these models is a change score, a negatively signed coefficient indicates 
that an increase in that variable leads to a reduced vote share for the member in the next election, 
as compared to their previous performance. As the table indicates, the coefficient for the 
commitment variables are significant for the models using running averages for the commitment 
score. In other words, controlling for key differences relevant to electoral performance, members 
that have a history of greater legislative commitment tend to see their vote share decline in the 
subsequent election, as compared to their colleagues without a history of prior commitment.  
While these results suggest that commitment is associated with a slight electoral penalty, 
does this mean that MCs risk their tenures in the Congress for the sake of devoting themselves to 
public policy? Or is this a case where members might suffer a slight electoral penalty, but one 
that does not substantially jeopardize their chances at reelection? To address these questions, I 
use a similar modeling strategy to test for an association between commitment and whether MCs 
lose their next elections. In these models, I use the same variables for legislative commitment 
and control variables as I did when using vote share change as the dependent variable, but I swap 
the vote share variable for an indicator variable that equals one if the member loses his or her 
next election. Accordingly, I use logistic regression instead of OLS. As the model estimates in 
Table 5.1 suggest, there is little indication that MCs risk their offices for the sake of legislative 
commitment. None of the regression coefficients for the different variables capturing current and 
past commitment reach statistical significance in models 5-8.  
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Table 5.1: Legislative Commitment and Electoral Outcomes 
 DV = Vote Share Change DV = Lost Next 0/1 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Commitment Score -0.39                            0.04                             
  (0.24)                            (0.11)                            
High Comm. 0/1         -0.51                             -0.50                     
          (0.54)                            (0.36)                    
Avg. Comm. Score                 -0.89 **                          0.09             
                  (0.33)                            (0.14)            
High Avg. Comm. 0/1                         -1.93 ***                         0.20     
                          (0.55)                            (0.30)    
Comm. Leader 0.06     -0.03     0.06     0.06     -0.00     0.08     -0.01     -0.00     
  (0.98)    (0.98)    (0.97)    (0.96)    (0.53)    (0.52)    (0.53)    (0.53)    
Party Leader 0.90     0.92     0.86     0.88     -0.19     -0.23     -0.19     -0.20     
  (0.96)    (0.96)    (0.96)    (0.95)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.51)    
Subcomm. Chr 0.52     0.48     0.56     0.54     -0.32     -0.28     -0.32     -0.31     
  (0.65)    (0.65)    (0.65)    (0.65)    (0.34)    (0.35)    (0.35)    (0.34)    
Majority -3.91 *** -3.97 *** -3.84 *** -3.84 *** -0.46     -0.45     -0.46     -0.47     
  (0.86)    (0.86)    (0.85)    (0.85)    (0.36)    (0.36)    (0.36)    (0.36)    
Seniority 0.00     0.00     0.02     0.0     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.01     
  (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    
Prev. Vote Share -0.57 *** -0.57 *** -0.57 *** -0.57 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    
Party Natl. Pct 0.06     0.07     0.06     0.06     0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 
  (0.16)    (0.16)    (0.16)    (0.16)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.08)    
Fit 4.00 *** 3.99 *** 4.07 *** 4.10 *** -1.24 *** -1.24 *** -1.24 *** -1.25 *** 
  (0.79)    (0.79)    (0.79)    (0.79)    (0.28)    (0.28)    (0.28)    (0.28)    
         
Constant 36.17 *** 35.19 *** 37.41 *** 36.19 *** -12.39 **  -12.25 **  -12.40 **  -12.28 **  
  (7.22)    (7.20)    (7.22)    (7.1)    (4.11)    (4.09)    (4.12)    (4.13)    
N 2829        2829 2829 2829 2829 2829 2829 2829 
R2     0.31     0.31     0.31     0.31     0.19        0.20        0.19        0.19        
Note: Cell entries are OLS and logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual MC. The dependent variables are 
next vote share (models 1-4) and a dichotomous indicator for losing the next election (1= lose) (models 4-8). *** p < 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; # 
p <   0.1. Analyses are limited to MCs that ran in the next election.   
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Voters at large in the constituency are not the only actors that MCs have to keep in mind 
when deciding whether to commit to lawmaking or not. MCs must also be mindful about how 
their legislative agendas could influence the type of opposing campaigns they face in the 
upcoming election. Even if voters in general are not sensitive to MCs’ patterns of legislative 
commitment, more attention could be paid to this aspect of their behavior among potential 
primary or general election challengers. Potential candidates decide whether to enter a race for 
Congress strategically, based on their assessment of their own strengths as a candidate as well as 
an assessment of the weaknesses of an incumbent (Lawless 2012; Maisel and Stone 2014). 
Extending this logic to the sphere of legislative strategy, ambitious challengers might perceive a 
low level of commitment as an indication of an MC is failing to satisfy the representational 
responsibility to engage in the lawmaking process. Alternatively, a challenger might perceive 
that a heavily committed member is a tempting target if the member is engaged in too much 
legislating, perhaps being attached to unpopular or controversial legislation or not paying enough 
attention to local matters. In this way, MCs’ legislative commitment could spur primary 
challengers or stronger, more experienced general election challengers. Thus, in either the 
primary or general election cases, it is likely that MCs’ levels of commitment are calibrated to 
avoid this outcome. 
I model the relationship between commitment and challenger entry to test whether MCs 
receive such benefits or face such risks when they shift their behavior towards that of a policy 
wonk. I use three different indicators related to challenger entry as dependent variables: (1) 
whether the member faces a primary challenger in the upcoming election, (2) whether the 
member is unopposed in the next election, and (3) whether the next general election challenger is 
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a quality candidate on the basis of having previous political experience. The independent 
variables are the different versions of the legislative commitment score, and the control variables 
are identical to those in the models for change in vote share.  
As with examining the relationship between vote share and legislative commitment, it is 
useful to note the baseline for these outcome variables capturing challenger entry. MCs face a 
primary challenger in 31% of the observations in my dataset, are unopposed in 13%, and face a 
quality challenger in 15%. In short, there is still a strong incumbency advantage at work. The 
results reflect this. In Table 5.2, I display the results of three sets of models: one set modeling 
whether the member is unopposed in the upcoming election, one set modeling whether a member 
faces a primary challenger, and one set for whether a MC faces a quality challenger in the 
general election. The results in the table provide no indication that legislative commitment 
provides an electoral benefit in terms of deterring challenger entry. As the regression coefficients 
show, there are no statistically significant relationships between commitment and the likelihood 
of facing a primary challenger or a quality general election challenger in the upcoming election. 
The only evidence of an electoral consequence in these results comes from the models for 
whether a member is unopposed in the upcoming election. There, the negative and significant 
coefficients for the commitment score, running average commitment score, and the indicator 
variable for whether the member has a high score for running average commitment suggest that, 
if anything, a reputation for being more committed makes it more likely that the MC will face a 
general election challenger. 
Taken together, these results testing for electoral consequences of legislative commitment 
support the conclusion that MCs are savvy, strategic operators when crafting their agendas. As I 
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Table 5.2: Legislative Commitment and Challenger Entry 
 DV = Unopposed in Next Election 0/1 DV= Next Challenger Experienced 0/1 DV= Primary Chal. in Next Election 
  Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 
9 
Model 10 Model 
11 
Model 12 
Commitment Score -0.14*                            -0.03    -0.16    
  (0.06)                            (0.07)    (0.13)    
High Comm. 0/1         -0.15    -0.03    -0.08   
          (0.15)    (0.14)    (0.11)   
Avg. Comm. Score          -0.28**    -0.04    -0.07  
           (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.07)  
High Avg. Comm. 
0/1 
          -0.44***    -0.10    -0.16 
            (0.16)    (0.18)    (0.13) 
Comm. Leader 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Party Leader 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Subcomm. Chr 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.33* 0.33* 0.33* 0.33* 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Majority -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.38* -0.39* -0.39* -0.38* 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Seniority -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prev. Vote Share 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Party Natl. Pct -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Fit 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.59*** 0.42* 0.41* 0.42* 0.42* 
  (0.06) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
             
Constant -2.63 -3.04 -2.24 -2.77 -2.32 -2.39 -2.31 -2.37 -4.41** -4.45** -4.32** -4.41** 
  (1.77 (1.78) (1.78) (1.78) (2.18) (2.18) (2.19) (2.18) (1.44) (1.44) (1.45) (1.44) 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 2831        2831 2831 2831 2198 2198 2198 2198 2913 2913 2913 2913 
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual MC. The dependent variables are indicators for whether 
the MCs is unopposed in the next election (1=unopposed, models 1-4), whether the MCs’ challenger in the next election is experienced (1= experienced, models 4-8), 
and whether the MC faces a primary challenger in the next election (1=challenged, model 9-12). *** p < 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; # p <   0.1. Analyses for all 
models are limited to MCs who ran for office in the next term. Ns vary due to missing data. 
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suggested, if MCs are talented and cautious politicians, they are not likely to allow their policy 
work to interfere with their electoral security. While diverting time and resources towards 
legislating might detract from a MC cultivating his or her constituents, we would not expect to 
see many members acting as policy wonks if it put them under electoral threat. This is essentially 
what we see in these results. There is some indication that acting like a policy wonk is associated 
with lower electoral performance, in the sense that doing so is associated with lower vote share 
and a slightly lower chance of running unopposed. However, greater legislative commitment is 
not associated with deterring challengers or losing the next election. While legislative 
commitment does not yield subsequent electoral benefits, nor does it seem related to consequent 
substantial electoral harm. The conclusion to draw is that being an intense, specialized, and 
consistent legislator is likely motivated or suppressed by other factors in congressional life. 
Commitment and Influence in Congress 
 The findings in the previous section provide evidence that MCs are not perfect when it 
comes to calibrating their levels of legislative commitment to match their electoral environment, 
but they appear to be quite good at it. The results indicate that members take a slight electoral 
penalty for committing, but MCs who do rarely lose subsequent elections or face serious 
electoral jeopardy. This could be either because citizens and challengers do not factor legislative 
commitment heavily in their decisions about who to turn out and vote for, or that MCs 
understand the political landscape and balance their levels of legislative commitment 
accordingly. On the other hand, the results are somewhat concerning from a normative 
perspective. Because investing in lawmaking or not strongly associated with an electoral 
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dividend for members, it seems that electoral incentives are unlikely to drive members towards 
this behavior. 
 There is, though, another avenue by which members might be drawn towards acting as a 
master of the public business. MCs may always be subject to the electoral connection, but they 
also have other objectives, among them gathering influence in Congress. If it is a way for 
members to advance in the chamber, then members might have an incentive to commit to 
legislating even if it is unlikely to lead to electoral dividends. In fact, as I described in Chapter 2, 
there are reasons to expect Congress to be organized to promote members who commit to 
lawmaking. Members of Congress have an interest in cultivating expertise among their 
colleagues and distributing their vast legislative and oversight workload (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Krehbiel 1992; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). To this end, MCs pledge their support and 
cede authority to caucus leaders as a mechanism for getting preferred policies through the 
chamber (Kanthak 2007; Rohde 1991). Thus, it would be sensible for the members to organize 
themselves in such fashion as to reward members that commit to the legislative process. A 
practical way to do this would be for members to “promote from within” when selecting which 
members to advance to positions of leadership in the chamber. By choosing to support 
legislatively committed members for leadership positions, MCs would be telegraphing to other 
members that if they want similar positions, they should make sure they attend to their legislative 
work. Further, even if such a strategic long-game is beyond the planning horizon for MCs, in any 
given leadership selection process, members may want to support members with reputations for 
hard work and expertise. Previous performance as a policy wonk could be an indication that a 
member can provide competent legislative leadership – and outcome that is good for rank-and-
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file members in the short term, regardless of broader notions about the health of congressional 
institutions. 
  All of this is to say that one of the reasons that MCs choose to commit to legislating is 
the prospect of amassing influence in the chamber. However, as with electoral outcomes 
associated with higher investment, I have yet to provide any evidence that legislative 
commitment is associated with such gains. To look for such an association, in the analyses that 
follow, I focus on whether MCs rise in the leadership hierarchy in Congress through committee 
leadership positions or through positions in party leadership. These positions are a prized 
commodity in Congress. Of the 1,038 members in my dataset, only 16% ever serve as a full 
committee chair or minority ranking member from the 101st to 110th Congresses.21 Similarly, 
only 13% ever hold a position of party leadership.  
To test whether legislative commitment aids MCs in their pursuit of these positions, I 
estimate two sets of regression models. First, I specify four models where the dependent variable 
is a dichotomous indicator for whether an MC obtains a committee leadership position in the 
next term by becoming either a committee chair or ranking member. The independent variables 
of interest are the different measures of legislative commitment – again, the legislative 
commitment score, an indicator variable for whether a MC has a score above the third quartile 
                                                     
21 By contrast, there are many more subcommittee chair positions. 41% of MCs in the dataset are 
a subcommittee chair for at least one term from the 101st to the 110th Congress. When I conduct a 
similar analysis for whether legislative commitment leads to gaining a subcommittee chair 
position, I do not find any evidence of a relationship. 
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for all observations, the running average commitment score, and an indicator for whether the 
member has a running average above the third quartile. Along with these variables of interest, I 
include a set of control variables, including whether the MC is in the majority, his or her 
seniority, and a score capturing the MC’s ideological extremity (the distance between the MC’s 
NOMINATE score and the median score for the chamber in that Congress). Then, I specify a 
second set of models using the same approach, except I use as the dependent variable an 
indicator variable for whether the member holds a party leadership position in the next term. 
Party leadership includes positions like majority or minority leader or a whip position. For all 
these models, I use subsets of the data including only members who do not hold a committee or 
party leadership position for the current term. Thus, a score of one on the outcome variable 
indicates that the member obtains a leadership position that he or she did not hold in the previous 
term. For both models, I use logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on member. 
 The model estimates are displayed in Table 5.3. The results paint a mixed picture. 
Turning first to the models for obtaining a committee leadership position in the next Congress, 
there is evidence that legislative commitment does position members to climb up the 
congressional hierarchy. The coefficients on the variables for high commitment in the previous 
term, running average commitment, and high running average commitment all either reach the 
p<0.05 level of statistical significance or approach it. This suggests that MCs are rewarded for 
their past legislative commitment by having an increased chance of obtaining a committee 
leadership position in the next Congress. The effect size is small, with even high investors 
having not much more than a 5% chance of receiving a committee leadership position. However, 
given the scarcity of committee leadership and ranking member positions in Congress, even  
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Table 5.3: Commitment and Obtaining Leadership Positions 
 Obtained Comm. Leader Position in Next Term Obtained Party Leader Position in Next Term 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Commitment Score 0.16                             -0.20 #                           
  (0.12)                            (0.11)                            
High Comm. 0/1         0.51 *                           -0.31                     
          (0.24)                            (0.27)                    
Avg. Comm. Score                 0.23 #                           -0.15             
                  (0.14)                            (0.13)            
High Avg. Comm. 0/1                         0.45 #                           -0.31     
                          (0.24)                            (0.28)    
Seniority 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 *** 0.23 *** -0.13 **  -0.14 **  -0.13 **  -0.14 **  
  (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    
Majority -0.15     -0.16     -0.14     -0.13     0.06     0.03     0.04     0.03     
  (0.38)    (0.38)    (0.39)    (0.38)    (0.28)    (0.28)    (0.28)    (0.28)    
Dist. from Chamber -0.36     -0.37     -0.32     -0.31     0.99     0.95     0.95     0.92     
     Median Ideology (0.70)    (0.70)    (0.69)    (0.70)    (0.61)    (0.61)    (0.61)    (0.61)    
         
Constant -4.59 *** -4.39 *** -4.72 *** -4.40 *** -2.56 *** -2.80 *** -2.62 *** -2.79 *** 
 (0.55)    (0.52)    (0.56)    (0.52)    (0.46)    (0.46)    (0.49)    (0.46)    
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 2171        2172        2172        2172        2200        2200        2200        2200        
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual MC. The dependent 
variables are indicator variables for whether the MC is a committee leader (chair or ranking member) in the next term (1=leader, 
models 1-4) and whether the member obtains a party leadership position in the next term (1=leader, models 4-8). *** p < 0.001; ** p 
<  0.01; * p <  0.05; # p <   0.1. Analyses are limited to MCs that do not hold a committee leadership position (models 1-4) or a party 
leadership position (models 5-8) and return in the next Congress. 
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marginal increases in the probability of obtaining a position might be an incentive for members 
to pursue a “wonky” strategy. By contrast, there is no indication from these model results that 
commitment is associated with a greater chance of obtaining a party leadership position. In fact, 
the negative coefficient for the legislative commitment score suggests that committing to 
legislating may marginally undermine MCs who want to advance in the party structure, though 
the evidence here is weak given that this is the only coefficient that reaches even marginal 
statistical significance in these models. 
 The takeaway from these results regarding legislative commitment and intra-chamber 
mobility is like that from looking at commitment and electoral security. While there is some 
evidence here that commitment is related to a member’s ability to achieve his or her objective of 
building influence in Congress, the results are mixed. This approach may pay off in the pursuit of 
committee leadership positions, but it does not for partisan leadership positions in the chamber. 
This is understandable because a MC’s colleagues may value different aspects of the resume  
when supporting candidates for committee versus partisan leadership positions. Yet overall, 
these results provide limited evidence of a dividend of legislative commitment. MCs might have 
slightly enhanced opportunities to advance through the committee leadership system through 
greater investment in lawmaking, but the benefits seem quite diffuse given the small number of 
these positions and low likelihood of getting them. 
Commitment and Career Ambitions Beyond Congress 
  Members of Congress attend to electoral concerns, and they also are interested in 
building influence in the chamber. Their record of legislative commitment factors into both these 
pursuits, but of course these are not the only goals that MCs pursue. Some MCs also carry with 
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them ambitions to move out of the House and into higher elective office, primarily seats in the 
Senate and governorships (Herrick and Moore 1993; Schlesinger 1966). In my dataset, only 13% 
of the MCs ever run for higher office, and higher office seekers from the House only win about 
one-third of the time. However, ambitious MCs do modify their legislative behavior in 
anticipation of a run for higher office, such as by becoming more specialized, more legislatively 
active, and altering their roll call behavior (Francis et al. 1994; LaForge 2013; Rothenberg and 
Sanders 2000; Victor 2010). 
As I described in my theoretical framework in Chapter 2, legislative commitment could 
arguably serve to either support or undermine such ambitions. When MCs contemplate running 
for higher office, they may want to enter this competition with a strong record of policy-related 
work, even if such efforts did not yield legislative success. This résumé can serve as the basis for 
campaign appeals or serve as a foundation for building alliances with relevant interest groups 
and other political actors. Yet as with many of the other relationships I examine, an alternative 
outcome is possible. Members who are highly committed may be so preoccupied with their 
legislative work that they do not spend time on preparing the groundwork for a run for higher 
office, gathering donors and building relationships that would aid such ambitions. For the 
purposes of this analysis, either outcome is substantively important. If members find that high 
levels of legislative commitment are not compatible with their colleagues’ professional 
ambitions, it would serve as another brake on the tendency for members to invest in lawmaking. 
If the opposite holds, then progressive ambition would support MCs’ active, persistent, and 
focused engagement with the lawmaking process. 
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Table 5.4: Commitment and Progressive Ambition 
 DV= Ran for Higher Office 0/1 DV= Won Race for Higher Office 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Commitment Score 0.08                             0.09                         
  (0.09)                            (0.33)                        
High Comm. 0/1         0.03                           -0.30                   
          (0.24)                          (0.61)                  
Avg. Comm. Score                 0.15                             0.46         
                  (0.12)                            (0.38)        
High Avg. Comm. 0/1                         0.05                           0.15   
                          (0.24)                          (0.64)  
Seniority -0.03     -0.02     -0.03     -0.02     0.22   0.20       0.23   0.22   
  (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.14)  (0.14)      (0.15)  (0.14)  
Majority 0.20     0.21     0.19     0.21     -0.40   -0.37       -0.39   -0.40   
  (0.31)    (0.31)    (0.31)    (0.31)    (0.88)  (0.89)      (0.88)  (0.87)  
Committee Leader -0.97     -0.96     -0.96     -0.96     -0.49   -0.50       -0.38   -0.43   
  (0.67)    (0.67)    (0.68)    (0.67)    (1.69)  (1.70)      (1.71)  (1.69)  
Party Leader 0.28     0.28     0.29     0.28     1.68 * 1.63 #     1.79 * 1.65 # 
  (0.31)    (0.31)    (0.32)    (0.31)    (0.85)  (0.87)      (0.87)  (0.85)  
Excl. Committee 0.08     0.08     0.09     0.08     -0.65   -0.61       -0.71   -0.65   
  (0.22)    (0.22)    (0.22)    (0.21)    (0.56)  (0.55)      (0.57)  (0.56)  
Subcomm. Chr. -0.22     -0.21     -0.22     -0.21     -0.17   -0.10       -0.17   -0.19   
  (0.33)    (0.33)    (0.33)    (0.33)    (0.72)  (0.73)      (0.72)  (0.74)  
Age 0.14     0.15     0.13     0.14     0.02   0.04       0.01   0.01   
  (0.12)    (0.12)    (0.12)    (0.12)    (0.44)  (0.44)      (0.45)  (0.44)  
Age 2 -0.00     -0.00     -0.00     -0.00     0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
  (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)      (0.00)  (0.00)  
Female -0.21     -0.21     -0.22     -0.21     -0.26   -0.22       -0.33   -0.29   
  (0.38)    (0.38)    (0.39)    (0.38)    (1.57)  (1.57)      (1.58)  (1.56)  
Next redistricting 0.05     0.05     0.05     0.05     0.26   0.27       0.30   0.27   
  (0.24)    (0.24)    (0.24)    (0.24)    (0.60)  (0.59)      (0.61)  (0.61)  
Delegation Size -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.04   -0.04       -0.04   -0.04   
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.03)  (0.03)      (0.03)  (0.03)  
Natl. Party Pct. -0.04     -0.04     -0.04     -0.04     -0.01   -0.02       -0.02   -0.01   
  (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.17)  (0.17)      (0.17)  (0.17)  
         
Constant -2.76     -2.69     -2.70     -2.67     -1.60   -1.75       -1.63   -1.48   
  (4.65)    (4.65)    (4.63)    (4.64)    (11.85)  (11.90)      (12.03)  (11.87)  
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
N 2676        2676        2676        2676        112      112          112      112      
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual MC. In 
models 1-4, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the MC runs for higher office (1=runs higher). Models 
1-4 are estimated using only observations for which there is a gubernatorial or senate race in the MC’s state. In 
models 5-8, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the MC wins a race for governor or Senate. Models 5-8 
are estimated using only observations in which the MC ran for higher office. *** p < 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; 
# p <   0.1.   
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I examine the relationship between legislative commitment and progressive ambition by 
testing for associations between commitment and the tendency for MCs to run for and win higher 
office. I examine the relationship between commitment and two dependent variables: (1) whether 
a member of Congress runs for higher office at the end of a term, and (2) whether a member 
succeeds at winning higher office. Using logistic regression and including a set of control 
variables, I find no relationships between any of the different formulations of commitment as an 
independent variable and either of these outcome variables. The results are displayed in Table 
5.4. In short, it appears whether a MC is a policy wonk has no bearing on his or her decision to 
run for higher office or the likelihood of the member winning. 
Commitment and Policy Productivity 
 So far in this chapter, I have provided an overview of the relationships that MCs see 
between commitment and three of their major goals: electoral security, gathering influence in 
Congress, and advancing their careers beyond the House. The evidence for a relationship 
between legislative commitment and these outcomes has been uneven. There are indications that 
acting like a policy wonk is associated with a slight electoral penalty and a slight benefit in rising 
in the House committee leadership structure, but there is no evidence that commitment helps 
members prepare for a run for higher office or helps MCs rise to party leadership. However, the 
fact that the costs or benefits of legislative commitment vis-à-vis these goals are diffuse should 
not be a surprise. First, if being a master of the public business was really the “secret sauce” of a 
successful congressional career, then we would not see the overall pattern of commitment to 
lawmaking that we do. It is uncommon for members to adopt active, specialized, and consistent 
legislative agendas, and this suggests that benefits for high commitment are not consistent across 
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members. Second, we would not expect to find a strong negative correspondence between 
commitment and MCs’ non-policy-related objectives. If such a penalty did exist, MCs who are 
sensitive to these consequences would learn to avoid them. 
While one might anticipate such subtlety in the relationships between commitment and 
non-policy related objectives, there remains another important goal of MCs that could be 
serviced by committing to legislating: legislative productivity and efficiency. As I have 
emphasized throughout this project, one of the reasons that MCs invest in lawmaking is likely 
that at least some members are genuinely interested in achieving policy outcomes. There are 
certainly MCs that feel that they can satisfy these objectives by supporting their party and voting 
on the issues that come before them in committees and on the floor. Such members delegate the 
majority of the work of formulating policy to others in Congress, and they would be happy to 
spend their time on other representational activities. That said, there are members that care 
passionately about policy issues, and their intention is to make their presence in Congress felt 
through legislative achievement. These members are likely to commit to legislating in 
expectation that it will result in their proposals making progress towards becoming law. 
In Congress, the odds are stacked against members as they try to move their bills towards 
becoming law. Out of the thousands of bills that are introduced in Congress in each term, only 
about 15% ever advance even to the committee stage, and the median number of bills a MC 
advances to the committee stage is one. Further, Congress deals with many policy issues 
episodically, when “policy windows” open. Members who want to deal with legislative issues 
must, to use Kingdon’s language, “strike when the iron is hot.” Legislative commitment, 
however, places MCs in the best position to do so. By having previously devoted time and 
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resources to cultivating expertise and preparing legislative packages, policy wonks would 
theoretically be ideally placed to see their bills advanced when opportunities arise. This 
argument suggests that legislative commitment should be connected with legislative success.  
In the analysis that follows, I test for such an association. I capture the notion of 
legislative success in two ways, drawing on Volden and Wiseman’s legislative effectiveness data 
(Volden and Wiseman 2014). First, I examine the relationship between legislative commitment 
and the quantity of legislation that MCs advances to different stages of the legislative process. 
Specifically, these different stages are (1) receiving action in the committee to which the 
legislation is referred, (2) action beyond the committee stage, (3) passing out of the chamber, (4) 
becoming law. Second, I consider the relationships between legislative commitment and the 
proportion of the member’s legislation that advances to these different stages. This captures 
legislative efficiency, measuring the likelihood that a member will see a piece of his or her 
legislation moving forward in the legislative process.  
 The modeling strategy that I use to capture the relationship between commitment and 
these legislative outcomes is slightly different than what I have used in my prior analyses. In 
Table 5.5, I display the results of a series of negative binomial models, where the dependent 
variable is the number of pieces of a MC’s introduced legislation that advance to each stage of 
the legislative process. I include a set of control variables related to legislative productivity. The 
key difference between the analysis here and in the prior sections is that, rather than model my 
outcome variable as a function of the legislative commitment score, I break apart the 
commitment score and use its two components, intensity and concentration, as separate 
independent variables (recall that concentration is the product of multiplying specialization and 
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consistency). I also include a term that interacts intensity and concentration. By decomposing 
commitment into its two components, I am able to show how the volume of legislative activity 
by a member in conjunction with a specialized and consistent strategy is related to legislative 
outcomes. 
The results of this first set of models are displayed in Table 5.5. As expected, the 
interaction term for intensity and concentration is statistically significant in all four models, 
suggesting that adopting a specialized and sustained pattern of legislating can affect the marginal 
returns of a MC’s slate of bill sponsorships. However, interaction terms are difficult to interpret 
without a visual aid, so I also include in Figure 5.1 a series of four plots that show the interactive 
relationships between intensity, concentration, and legislative productivity. On the y-axis of 
these four plots are the counts of the number of a MC’s bills that reach each stage of the 
legislative process (action in committee, action beyond committee, pass the chamber, and 
becoming law). On the x-axis is the MC’s intensity score (which, as a reminder, is a scaled count 
of how many bills the member sponsors in a term). The two lines of these graphs track the 
predicted values for the outcome variable using the model formula from Table 5.5 at the 
corresponding values of intensity. The darker shading and solid line shows the predicted values 
for the dependent variable when the MC has a concentration score that is one standard deviation 
above the mean, while the dotted line and lighter shading shows concentration at one standard 
deviation below the mean. The curve of the lines is due to this being a negative binomial model.
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Table 5.5: Legislative Commitment and Lawmaking Productivity 
 DV=Action 
in 
Committee 
DV=Action 
Beyond 
Committee 
DV=Pass 
in the 
House 
DV=Became 
Law 
   
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
Intensity 0.50 *** 0.48 *** 0.45 *** 0.30 *** 
  (0.06)    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.09)    
Concentration -0.13 *   -0.09     -0.12 #   -0.17 #   
  (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.10)    
Intensity X Concentration 0.10 *** 0.07 *   0.07 *   0.11 **  
 (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.04)    
Democrat -0.09     -0.32 *** -0.34 *** -0.36 *** 
  (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.08)    (0.09)    
Majority 0.70 *** 1.05 *** 1.04 *** 0.99 *** 
  (0.08)    (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.13)    
Seniority 0.01     0.02     0.01     0.02 #   
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    
Party Leader 0.02     -0.03     -0.06     0.18     
  (0.09)    (0.11)    (0.12)    (0.13)    
Committee Leader 0.36 *** 0.53 *** 0.51 *** 0.54 *** 
  (0.09)    (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.14)    
Exclusive Committee -0.34 *** -0.35 *** -0.34 *** -0.44 *** 
  (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.09)    
Ideol. Dist. to Median -0.57 *** -0.16     -0.10     -0.26     
  (0.17)    (0.20)    (0.22)    (0.26)    
Female -0.10     0.04     0.03     -0.06     
  (0.09)    (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.13)    
Nonwhite 0.04     0.15     0.20     0.21     
  (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.12)    (0.15)    
Delegation Size -0.00     0.00     0.00     -0.00     
  (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
Previous Vote Shae -0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     
  (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
     
      
Constant -1.36 *** -2.08 *** -2.16 *** -2.56 *** 
  (0.23)    (0.26)    (0.28)    (0.33)    
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.21 
N 3292        3292        3292        3292        
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering 
on the individual MC. The dependent variables are counts of how many bills introduced by the MC in a 
term get to that stage in that term. *** p < 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; # p <   0.1.   
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Figure 5.1: Commitment and Legislative Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 The different panels in Figure 5.1 are indicative of the legislative benefits of MCs being 
committed to legislating. At lower levels of intensity, there is no difference in the legislative 
productivity of members whose agendas are concentrated (i.e. specialized and consistent) and 
those that are not. However, as intensity approaches the third quartile (an intensity score of about 
three, corresponding to about 14 introduced bills), the predicted values for the dependent 
variables begin to diverge based on MCs’ levels of concentration. MCs who are more 
concentrated than average begin to see greater returns in terms of legislative productivity than  
Note: Figures display predicted values for measures of legislative productivity at 
different levels of intensity. The darker shading and solid line shows the predicted 
values and confidence interval for the dependent variable when the MC has a 
concentration score that is one standard deviation above the mean, and the dotted 
line and lighter shading shows concentration at one standard deviation below the 
mean. 
124 
 
their colleagues who are equally active legislators but are not as concentrated. The differences in 
the predicted values are clearest at the earliest stages of the legislative process, when counting 
the number of a MC’s bills that receive attention in the committee to which they are referred. 
However, the effects are still present at all stages, all the way up to the number of a MC’s bills 
that become law. In short, the results in these plots are evidence of a legislative benefit to 
legislative commitment: given similarly high levels of legislative activity, members that are more 
committed by pursuing a concentrated agenda are relatively more productive. One might say that 
these MCs who invest in lawmaking get “more bang for their buck.” 
Another way of assessing how commitment is related to legislative outcomes is to look 
for a relationship between commitment and the fraction of a MC’s bills that reach different 
stages. In other words, this is studying commitment’s relationship to legislative efficiency 
instead of legislative productivity. Along with seeing more bills make progress towards 
becoming law, commitment might also be associated with members seeing a larger proportion of 
their bills making such progress. To test this, I use a similar modeling strategy as I did in testing 
legislative productivity, but I use as my dependent variable the fraction of a member’s legislation 
that proceeds from one stage of the legislative process to another. This means dividing the 
number of an MC’s bills that progress to one stage of the legislative process by the total number 
of bills that made it to the previous stage. Additionally, because this is not a count variable, I use 
OLS regression models instead of negative binomial matters; I continue to use robust standard 
errors clustered on member. 
 The results for four models of legislative efficiency are displayed in Table 5.6. The four 
models correspond with efficiency at each the stage of the legislative process: the proportion of  
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Table 5.6: Legislative Commitment and Lawmaking Efficiency 
  DV= Action in 
Committee/Bills 
 
 
Model 1 
DV= 
Action Beyond 
Committee/AIC 
 
Model 2 
DV= 
Pass/AIC 
 
 
Model 3 
DV= 
Law/Pass 
 
 
Model 4 
Intensity -0.03 ***   0.02     -0.04       -0.10 *   
  (0.01)      (0.03)    (0.02)      (0.04)    
Concentration -0.01 #     0.02     -0.04       -0.06     
  (0.01)      (0.03)    (0.03)      (0.04)    
Intensity X Concentration 0.01 ***   -0.02     0.01       0.03     
  (0.00)      (0.01)    (0.01)      (0.02)    
Democrat -0.01       -0.17 *** -0.04 #     0.01     
  (0.01)      (0.04)    (0.02)      (0.03)    
Majority 0.06 ***   0.18 *** -0.04       -0.06     
  (0.01)      (0.05)    (0.04)      (0.05)    
Seniority 0.00       0.01     -0.00       0.00     
  (0.00)      (0.00)    (0.00)      (0.00)    
Party Leader 0.01       -0.05     -0.02       0.14 **  
  (0.01)      (0.05)    (0.04)      (0.04)    
Committee Leader 0.04 ***   0.16 **  -0.01       0.05     
  (0.01)      (0.06)    (0.03)      (0.04)    
Exclusive Committee -0.03 ***   -0.00     0.00       -0.03     
  (0.01)      (0.03)    (0.02)      (0.03)    
Dist. to Chamber Median -0.07 ***   0.05     -0.03       -0.11     
  (0.02)      (0.11)    (0.07)      (0.08)    
Woman -0.01       0.06     -0.02       0.01     
  (0.01)      (0.05)    (0.03)      (0.04)    
Nonwhite 0.01       0.11 *   0.06       -0.04     
  (0.01)      (0.05)    (0.04)      (0.04)    
Delegation Size 0.00   0.00     0.00   -0.00     
  (0.00)      (0.00)    (0.00)      (0.00)    
Previous Vote Share 0.00       0.00     -0.00       0.00     
  (0.00)      (0.00)    (0.00)      (0.00)    
     
Constant 0.14 ***   0.42 **  1.01 ***   0.71 *** 
  (0.02)      (0.14)    (0.09)      (0.12)    
R 0.12       0.06     0.01       0.03     
N 3283          1796        1488          1292        
Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual 
MC. The dependent variables are ratios of how many bills introduced by the MC get to each lawmaking 
stage, divided by how many bills made it to the prior stage. *** p < 0.001; ** p <  0.01; * p <  0.05; # p <   
0.1.  Ns decrease because some MCs do not get any bills to that stage.  
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Figure 5.2: Commitment and Lawmaking Efficiency 
  
 
 
 
sponsored bills that receive action in committee, the proportion of bills that receive attention in 
committee that advance out of committee, the proportion of bills that advance out of committee 
that pass the chamber, and the proportion of bills that pass that chamber that eventually become 
law. As with the models for legislative productivity, the coefficient of interest is the interaction 
term for intensity and concentration. As the table indicates, this coefficient is only statistically 
significant in the first model, which tests for a relationship between the components of 
investment and the proportion of sponsored bills that are taken up by a committee. Yet while this 
is the only stage of the legislative process where intensity and concentration have an interactive 
relationship, this finding is substantively interesting. To aid in interpreting the interaction term, I 
provide a plot of predicted values in Figure 5.2. On this plot, the y-axis is the fraction the bills 
that a member introduces that receive attention in a committee, and the x-axis is legislative 
Note: Figure displays predicted values for ratio of introduced bills that advance to 
receive action at the committee stage at different levels of intensity. The darker 
shading and solid line shows the predicted values and confidence interval for the 
dependent variable when the MC has a concentration score that is one standard 
deviation above the mean, and the dotted line and lighter shading shows 
concentration at one standard deviation below the mean. 
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intensity. Again, the two lines display the predicted values for the dependent variable at two 
different levels of concentration, one standard deviation above and below the mean. As the figure 
displays, for members who are more concentrated that average, the proportion of their bills that 
receive action in committee increases slightly as members increase their legislative intensity. 
However, for members that are less concentrated than average, additional legislative intensity 
does not pay off. Members with diluted (unconcentrated) agendas see lower levels of legislative 
efficiency associated with increased intensity. What this suggests substantively is that  
members who are not focused in their legislative activities do not get the same kind of return on 
their investment as a member with a more focused agenda. Another way to think about this is 
that the plot shows that using bill sponsorship as a means to take positions across many issues,  
while it might have some advantage as a campaign tactic, does not result in greater legislative 
productivity.  
These models of the relationship between legislative outcomes and the components of 
legislative commitment provide evidence that one of the benefits associated with having an 
intense, specialized, and consistent agenda is enhanced legislative productivity and efficiency. 
This finding hearkens back to one of my motivations for investigating legislative commitment. In 
Chapter 2, I noted that noted policy wonk Henry Waxman once stated that sustained activity and 
focus was a recipe for legislative success in Congress. Additionally, in their study of legislative 
effectiveness, Volden and Wiseman (2014) noted the need for studies that could test whether 
specialization was indeed a “habit of successful lawmakers” as they suggested. The findings in 
this section help to answer these questions. When they commit to lawmaking by adopting a 
legislative strategy characterized by intensity, specialization, and consistency, members of 
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Congress are more productive legislators and, at least at the critical early stages of the legislative 
process, more efficient. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I tested for relationships between commitment and the satisfaction of 
MCs’ electoral goals, their desire for influence in Congress, their career ambitions beyond 
Congress, and their legislative and policymaking objectives. As would be expected in observing 
the actions of strategic politicians, the results suggest that some of the costs and benefits that 
flow from legislative commitment are diffuse. I found evidence that members face a slight 
electoral penalty for legislative commitment and might receive a slight career benefit in terms of 
advancing to positions of committee leadership. However, the most notable finding of the 
chapter comes from the results of tests for associations between commitment and legislative 
productivity and efficiency. Being a master of the public business may have only weak 
connections to members’ non-policy-related objectives, but members that are policy wonks 
display better legislative outcomes as compared to their colleagues who do not invest in 
lawmaking. 
In a sense, the results in this chapter make a simple point: if members want to be 
successful lawmakers, they are more likely to be if they generate a focused, coherent legislative 
agenda and keep working on it across time. More broadly, this chapter serves as additional 
evidence that MCs are competent strategic actors who allocate time and resources appropriately 
to meet their goals. Committing to lawmaking appears to be related to MCs being successful 
legislators without bearing crippling electoral or career costs. In conjunction with the results I 
presented in Chapter 4 regarding how political context and personal characteristics modify the 
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prospective costs and benefits of investing in policy, this analysis underscores that MCs are 
skilled at managing the tradeoffs associated with a congressional career. Yet even as my work 
has underscored this point, it has also pointed to a variety of implications and raised questions 
about how MCs operate as policymakers. I will turn my attention to reviewing these matters up 
next, in the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: Studying Policy Wonks Today and in the Future 
 
 In their 2016 book, Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government – 
And Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency, two scholars of the American presidency, 
William Howell and Terry Moe, give a brutal assessment of Congress’s policymaking capacity. 
Howell and Moe’s broadside has three salvos. First, they point out that members of Congress are 
parochial, concerned primarily with protecting special interests in their districts. Second, they 
argue that congressional policymaking is myopic, generating policies that frontload benefits and 
ignore long-term consequences. Finally, Howell and Moe underscore that the joint effect of this 
parochialism and myopia seriously undermines principles of good bureaucratic design, leading to 
agency duplication, overlap, and mismatch. Howell and Moe’s solution is to make a major 
constitutional fix: give the presidency a fast-track legislative proposal power. 
 As I write this in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections, it is fair to say that there 
would be many opponents to giving the presidency additional powers.22 However, the wisdom of 
Howell and Moe’s proposed reform is a question to engage with another day. Their and others’ 
critiques of Congress are cogent and forceful, backed up by persuasive research that speaks to 
American governmental dysfunction. I fully agree with the notion that today’s political 
environment should prompt political leaders, citizens, and scholars to contemplate tinkering with 
American lawmaking institutions. Reasonable people can agree that the bottoming out of trust in 
                                                     
22 I am not the first observer of Congress to have this response to Howell and Moe’s work. For a 
similar take, see Burgat and Kosar (2017). 
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government and the seeming inability of government to get ahead of looming crises is a cause for 
serious concern. It may be that major reforms are in order. 
However, I have shown in this dissertation that it is not necessary to give up on Congress. 
There are many members of Congress who are dedicated legislators. Some MCs have consistent, 
specialized, and active agendas, as we would expect of Madison and Hamilton’s masters of the 
public business. Furthermore, I have presented evidence that these MCs see results, with more of 
their bills advancing in the legislative process. This finding accords with observations made by 
Henry Waxman, who I have referenced in the preceding chapters. Waxman might agree with 
many of Howell and Moe’s critiques of Congress. In the closing pages of his memoir, he writes 
that his career in Congress taught him that “significant achievements often seem likely to be 
long, hard, and wearying” (Waxman and Green 2009, 224). But Waxman’s conclusion is quite 
different: he underscores that with the right legislative strategy, it is possible for MCs to do 
“good work [that] can make a difference in the lives of millions of Americans – which, in the 
end, is a lawmaker’s highest purpose” (Waxman and Green 2009, 224). 
Waxman’s point echoes how the Framers felt about lawmakers. Hamilton, Madison, and 
their colleagues knew that governing a republic would be difficult, and they still designed the 
American constitutional system to be, first, built on the foundation of legislative power and, 
second, reliant on the work of representatives who become policy wonks. Thus, rather than 
further aggrandizing the presidency, I join those who argue that it is time to think about 
institutional reforms that can help rehabilitate Congress’s legislative capacity. However, as we 
contemplate changing the gears in the black box of federal policymaking, caution is in order. As 
I described in my opening chapter, political scientists have done far less research on the 
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antecedents and consequences of legislative entrepreneurship than they have on other aspects of 
legislative behavior. Put simply, to date there is not a good answer to the question of why some 
MCs are policy wonks while others are not. 
My work is this dissertation is a step towards providing such insight. With an eye to the 
normative concerns about the performance of Congress and its members, I have argued that it is 
important to study policy wonks, have provided a conceptual discussion of what this term means, 
outlined a theoretical and empirical framework for studying this behavior, and have conducted a 
set of analyses designed to explain variation in the degree to which MCs are masters of the 
public business. My research builds on that of other scholars who have studied policy 
entrepreneurship, but it is unique in that I make policy wonks my primary empirical and 
theoretical focus. The research strategy I have presented thus provides a launching point for a 
series of studies that can help political scientists learn more about Madison and Hamilton’s 
legislators, as well as inform citizens and leaders as they consider ways to strengthen Congress 
as the central institution of national policymaking. 
Summary of Research and Implications 
 I view the overall takeaway from this dissertation as twofold. First, by providing a 
conceptualization and operationalization of legislative commitment, I have demonstrated that 
focusing on policy wonks can be a fruitful line of investigation for congressional scholars. In the 
first three chapters, I described an approach for measuring the extent which MC commit to 
legislating, and I drew on previous scholarship to make predictions about the factors that are 
related to MCs being policy wonks in Congress. In doing so, I established that the behavior of 
policy wonks is a crucial theoretical element in American constitutional design, that it relates 
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closely with contemporary concerns about Congress’s policymaking capacity, and that there are 
workable research strategies for investigating this congressional behavior.  
The second major conclusion I draw from this research is that legislative commitment is a 
predictable behavior, structured by same forces that scholars typically associate with other 
congressional activities. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that legislative commitment has 
associations with the institutional positions of MCs, the contextual features of their districts, and 
MCs’ personal characteristics. While not all my results were in line with my expectations, they 
do validate the idea that members of Congress commit to legislating as a function of the 
perceived costs and benefits of doing so. Factors like holding privileged institutional positions or 
the extent to which constituents demand policy-based representation can decrease costs and 
increase potential benefits of policy-related activities, and my results echo this. The results in 
Chapter 5 also support the idea that MCs choose to commit to legislating strategically. My 
analysis provides evidence that MCs decide to commit to legislating based on a rational, strategic 
calculation. My results showed that representatives do not suffer dramatic electoral penalties 
when they behave as a policy wonk and, further, that committing to legislating is associated with 
career advancement and legislative effectiveness.  
The normative implications of these findings are mixed. Madison and Hamilton expected 
that Congress would self-populate with masters of the public business. I think this is true, 
because I can identify members based on their legislative commitment score who are dedicated 
lawmakers. However, the institutional incentives in Congress are not all aligned to promote this 
outcome. Perhaps most importantly, MCs do not have to be policy wonks to win elections, and 
the evidence does not suggest that being committed to legislating is met with much electoral 
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response. In fact, perhaps unsettlingly so, my findings suggest that too much electoral 
competition in Congress might actually be a bad thing for institutional capacity. Members seem 
more comfortable investing in lawmaking when they are in the majority, more senior, and in 
leadership positions, while shifts in majority control have disruptive effects. These findings 
should also be considered in light of the intense competition for control of the chamber, which 
likely creates uncertainty and drives members to spend time supporting the party. 
Another normatively worrisome result from this research is the substantial differences 
between how MCs represent affluent and less-affluent populations. I find that whether an MC is 
a policy wonk is related to the economic status of an MCs constituency. Scholars have contended 
with the problem of inequality in representation in the past, with disturbing findings about the 
likelihood that elite interests dominate over those of the working class (see, e.g., Gilens 2014). 
My results lend strength to this viewpoint. If poorer constituents have MCs that are less devoted 
to lawmaking, there is no surprise that these citizens’ preferences are less likely to be reflected in 
the crafting and implementation of national policy. 
 What should prospective institutional tinkerers make of these results? First, much is 
uncertain. MCs may end up being policy wonks for idiosyncratic reasons, and nothing in my 
results suggests that any single factor is determinative. However, this does not mean that reforms 
that would support legislating in Congress would be useless. Clearly, some MCs arrive in 
Congress and want to legislate, and MCs do it even when the benefits are diffuse. There is also 
enough evidence here for me to feel comfortable saying that MCs’ lawmaking patterns are 
structured by cost-benefit analyses, meaning that MCs should be responsive to measures that 
would decrease the costs of legislating to them and increase the potential benefits. There are a 
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variety of proposals that might build off this finding, some of which have already been suggested 
by Congress watchers (see, e.g., Burgat and Kosar 2017; Carrington 2018; Congressional 
Galston 2012; Mills and Selin 2017, Reynolds 2015). While crafting a specific proposal is a 
project for the future, my general recommendation would be to keep in mind this critical finding: 
during the time I examine, individual MCs were working to generate policy ideas, and the 
pattern of them doing so demonstrates that they did so in response to incentives. This can be a 
foundation for future reforms. 
Future Paths for Research 
 My work in this dissertation opens the door to a fruitful research agenda. One extension 
will be to expand the temporal scope of the project. I studied ten Congresses in this project, 
which was an adequate place to begin, but expanding the timeframe of the analysis both 
backwards and forwards could offer more insights. Congress was a very different place in the 
1980s prior to the Republican takeover. A long period of stable Democratic control meant that 
many members spent their entire careers in the majority, amassing seniority, and holding 
committee leadership positions. Given the relationship I find between MCs being policy wonks 
and these institutional positions, I suspect that the dynamics shaping this behavior in the 1980s 
were quite different and would merit additional investigation. The same is likely true of the 
period from 2008 until today. The increasingly intense competition for congressional control and 
fierce partisanship in the chamber have seemed to only amplify of late. Whether this is having a 
corrosive impact on MCs’ attending to policy work is simply unknown. With additional data 
gathering, an addition to this study could provide a better sense for how MCs have changed (or 
not) as lawmakers across time. 
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 Along with getting a wider view, a closer-up examination of legislating is also in order. 
As I have referenced, Fenno’s observational studies, and especially Representation at the 
Grassroots, provided great theoretical insights. A return to this style of scholarship, to see 
firsthand how lawmaking is done in the tumultuous period of the Trump administration, would 
lend substantial credibility to this research. In my view, a key assumption needs to be tested 
about legislative behavior: just how hard is it to legislate? The entire cost-benefit framework that 
I apply to studying policy-related behavior in this dissertation is premised on the idea that 
writing legislation is resource intensive. I argue that members have to be making a strategic 
choice about how to divide their energies across policy and non-policy behaviors, but this is 
difficult to claim in the abstract. If I could provide a close account of a bill writing process, I 
would have a better sense of the costs and benefits involved, as well as the strategic motivations 
that go into writing legislation. Fieldwork in the next year can help to validate the research. 
 Another avenue forward is to continue to refine the measurement strategy I used in this 
project. I believe it is appropriate to use the components of intensity, specialization, and 
consistency as guides for assessing whether MCs are masters of the public business. However, I 
think there are ways to improve my approach. Figuring out how to distinguish wonks and non-
wonks and how to construct a continuous measure were major obstacles in this project. 
Experimenting with different weighting schemes and different ways to combine the components 
could improve the measure’s reliability and precision. Thinking about how to incorporate other 
forms of legislative activity would also be helpful. I focused on bill sponsorship, which I believe 
is a good proxy for other kinds of legislative behavior. However, leveraging other behaviors like 
amendments and cosponsorship would be an advance. There may also be a way to get into the 
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text of legislation, using the content of bills to characterize their complexity, their similarity to 
other pieces of legislation, and other markers that would reflect how much time and effort went 
into their design. 
 More attention to political communication would also enhance the project. Although I 
gathered some stories and profiles of individual MCs for this project, a more robust and 
comprehensive effort to study how policy wonks are covered by the media would add an 
additional dimension. From previous work, we know that some MCs work to build an impression 
of influence, taking credit for accomplishments and communicating this with constituents 
(Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). However, there is very likely variation in the extent 
to which policy wonks engage in this behavior and their skill at doing so. Whether a policy wonk 
is successful could be contingent in part on his or her communication strategy, and it is also 
possible that some MCs affect the personae of a policy wonk but do not back this up with 
legislative accomplishments. If the face of policy wonks is different than the MCs that are doing 
the work, then there may be a mismatch between what citizens think Congress is doing and what 
is really happening. 
 Finally, the finding that MCs from less affluent districts are less committed to legislating 
merits additional study. Increasing inequality is one of the key economic and social trends in the 
first quarter of the 21st century. Additionally, the continued salience of identity politics in the 
first term of the Trump administration suggests that MCs may find that playing to racial, ethnic, 
and economic anxieties is a politically expedient strategy. The implications for policymaking 
could be very serious. If policies are designed to appeal to citizens’ sense of social identity or if 
government policy continues to be geared towards elite preferences, it is hard to imagine trust in 
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government recovering or improvements in congressional lawmaking efficiency. I am prepared 
to accept the possibility that the best days of the policy wonk are behind and ahead of us; it 
seems unlikely that it is today. 
Closing Thoughts 
 I opened this dissertation with the claim that studying Congress in the first quarter of the 
21st century is not for the faint of heart. Of course, I could name any number of professions that 
are more harrowing and at least as intellectually rigorous as being a legislative scholar. But, 
truly, conducting research about an institution that is so broadly criticized and held in such low 
regard does take a certain toll. At the most quotidian level, it makes for tough conversations 
when someone asks what you do for a living. At the most existential, it provokes a certain 
anxiety about the prospects for democratic governance. Learning about the pathologies of 
democratic institutions, including Congress, raises fears about the ability of societies to organize 
politically, overcome collective action problems, and address the problems that citizens face. 
Focusing on policy wonks offers something of a respite. Madison and Hamilton believed 
– or perhaps they had faith – that representatives would become masters of the public business. 
As I have described, there are certainly MCs that live up to their expectations. Policy wonks like 
those I have examined in this project adopt intense, specialized, and consistent legislative 
agendas, and, in doing so, they get things done for their constituents and the nation. Even so, 
there remain unanswered questions about why MCs do this, what they stand to gain or lose from 
it, and whether anything can be done to support this normatively desirable behavior.  
More work needs to be done on each of these fronts. However, as I move forward, I am 
confident that advancing this research agenda can help scholars to teach students about why 
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Congress works or doesn’t, it can inform the decisions of voters, and it can guide the actions of 
reformers who want to see the institution satisfy its constitutional purpose. To extent that this 
helps a legislative scholar sleep easier in the future, so much the better. 
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